

# **REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL COHESION IN KWAZULU-NATAL**

DECEMBER 2015

## Acknowledgments

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## List of Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
ASGI-SA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative – South Africa
B-BBEE	Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment
BUSA	Business Unity South Africa
COPE	Congress of the People
DAC	Department of Arts and Culture
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EAP	Economically Active Population
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution Policy
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IDP	Integrated Development Plan
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
MISTRA	Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection
NDP	National Development Plan
NFP	National Freedom Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSS	Operation Sukuma Sakhe
PDI	Previously Disadvantaged Individual
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SMME	Small, Medium and Micro-Sized Enterprises
UDF	United Democratic Front
UKZN	University of KwaZulu-Natal

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## **1 Executive Summary**

This report is the result of an enquiry into factors that threaten social cohesion in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) to determine these threats' underlying causes and dynamics, and to provide recommendations to the Provincial Government's Executive Council towards strengthening its policies and interventions. This investigation was conducted by a Special Committee on Social Cohesion, appointed by the Executive Council of the KZN Provincial Government, to investigate the threats to social cohesion in the Province, the context from which they emerge and the possible actions that can be instituted to deal with the challenge.

The Special Committee comprised Prof Paulus Zulu (Director: Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit, UKZN) (Chair), Prof Cheryl Potgieter (Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Head of College: Humanities, UKZN), Mr Paddy Kearney (Chairperson, Denis Hurley Centre Trust), and Mr Vasu Gounden (Founder and Executive Director: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes). The Special Committee was supported by a Secretariat of six staff. In order to fulfil the above-mentioned mandate, the Special Committee undertook an investigation comprising interviews and stakeholder consultations over an 8-week period, accompanied by extensive literature and media surveys to contextualise the study. The findings of the Special Committee's investigation are contained in the report that follows.

Data gathered in the course of the investigation has led the Special Committee to conclude that the realisation of a more socially cohesive society is fundamentally dependent upon how KZN pursues greater socio-economic equality and how it promotes higher degrees of mutual acceptance within and between its diverse communities. This conclusion is based upon three central findings. First, that colonialism and apartheid socially engineered skills, capital and opportunities, thus bequeathing South Africa with a legacy of poverty, unemployment and inequality. Second, 21 years after securing democratic governance in South Africa, the challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality persist: although poverty has been reduced statistically (through social grants and other interventions) unemployment, inequality and relative deprivation have grown, impacting negatively on social cohesion. And third, despite corrective interventions from both national and provincial government structures since 1994 - which have resulted in many positive outcomes across KZN - there have been unintended consequences that have also contributed negatively to social cohesion.

The various threats to social cohesion, which emanate from and manifest across broader structural, institutional, and societal dimensions of daily life, largely stem from the prevalent socio-economic inequalities that pervade and influence society at large. The discussion below, highlights the most salient and urgent of the identified threats to social cohesion that emerged during the course of this investigation.

**Structural Threats:** The investigation has shown that structural threats present urgent challenges to mutual acceptance in the context of KZN, one of the definitive goals of social cohesion. Historically, differentiated discrimination underpinned inter-racial tensions in the Province. The Special Committee observed that many of the participants within the consultations placed emphasis on class standing and socio-economic issues, as well as racial dynamics, as important mediums of self and communal identification. As so many discussions focused primarily on socio-economic and class-driven experiences, the Special Committee has been further enlightened by the salience of structural inequalities and how they impact upon individuals' perceptions of themselves and those around them. Amongst the identified structural threats to social cohesion, the following should receive the most urgent consideration:

***Socio-economic inequalities:*** The urgency of reducing socio-economic inequalities emerged as central to the pursuit of greater social cohesion in KZN. This dimension has wide and varied impacts upon all aspects of human life. In a society characterised by deep inequality, high rates of poverty and unemployment, the economic dimension of social cohesion cannot be underplayed. In various contexts, ranging from inequality, the broadening gap between 'haves' and 'have-nots', education and unemployment, participants perceived socio-economic issues to be the number one threat to social cohesion in the Province. The challenges facing KZN's socio-economic landscape, while rooted in colonialism and apartheid, appear to participants to have been compounded over the last twenty-one years of democratic governance. The threats from this category manifest in a range of inequalities that affect not only how people live today, but crucially, their opportunities, and those of their children, for improving their life chances. KZN's comparatively high poverty rates, with over 26% of the country's impoverished population resident in this province, disaggregates to over 56,3% of KZN inhabitants living in poverty (Stats SA, 2014c: 31). Buttressed

by alarmingly high rates of income inequality throughout the country (as quantified by the country's gini-coefficient calculations) socio-economic inequalities further underpin the extent to which KZN remains a structurally un-equal society.

***Unequal access to quality education:*** Challenges in terms of individuals' access to institutions as well as the quality of education within primary and secondary institutions, remains central to participants' perceptions of threats to social cohesion in KZN. Discussions throughout this study continuously pointed to disparities in the education system as central to the underlying socio-economic inequalities. Divisions between those learners who have access to quality education, and those who do not, largely remain predicated along the historical lines of marginalization that defined the apartheid era, namely race, socio-economic status, and geographic location. The disadvantages of unequal access to both quality instruction and extra-curricular support are most readily observed within the subjects of mathematics, English, science and commerce. Despite the KZN Department of Education's efforts to improve the Province's education system radically, more broadly these challenges will take many years, if not decades, to rectify fundamentally. As identified earlier, although skilled employment has grown as a proportion of total employment since 1994, uneven and marginal gains in skills development, especially within the Black African community, remains a significant contributor to high levels of poverty, unemployment, and socio-economic inequalities (Statistics SA, 2014a).

***Infrastructure deficits:*** Participants noted that the spatial legacies of apartheid in KZN have yet to be resolved and continue to exacerbate tensions that threaten social cohesion. Despite best efforts to increase the provision of public housing, increase spending on infrastructure and ensure the reliable provision of basic services, the participants' perceived continued inequalities within KZN's townships, peri-urban communities, shacks and transit camps are cause for concern. These spatial inequalities contribute to unequal access to basic housing, education, health services, utilities, and gainful permanent employment opportunities. These inequalities, many revealed in our discussions, fuel perceptions throughout society of an 'us versus them' mentality. It should be noted, however, that in terms of the layout of residential areas, divisions that were historically based upon race, are now based on class to a greater extent. These deficits continue to define individuals' lived day-to-day experiences strongly and have impacted upon their psychological and material well-being.



**Institutional Threats:** Institutional threats identified by participants not only heighten and exacerbate zero-sum competition over political power and influence, but also amplify the structural economic inequities and negative prejudices and marginalisation of various communities. Differentiated access to economic opportunities along race and class lines run the risk of providing the basis for discrimination. Certain participants also perceived political affiliation to be a vehicle for pursuing economic advancement. For example, the utterances by interest groups must be seen in the context of an expectation that since 1994, Black economic aspirations would be met on a broad scale. However, competition over political power should not be seen as exclusively racial, but rather based upon economic inequality. Where such inequality is perceived to be tied to corruption, participants felt all the more aggrieved. It is worth noting that, as in many other such experiences nationally and globally, anger in this instance is directed not at the main, erstwhile historical beneficiaries of privilege (the White community and specifically White capital); but at those beneficiaries who are seen as closer in terms of ethnicity and to whom those who are angry have most access in the course of everyday life. Amongst the identified institutional threats to social cohesion, the following should receive the most urgent consideration:

***Racialised economic competition:*** The racialised and inequitable economic competition perceived by citizens of KZN was central to the discussions of social cohesion. Participants expressed serious concerns and reservations about existing structures, policies, and practices related to government procurement and the environment for small and medium businesses in the province. Stakeholders questioned the repeated awarding of tenders to select individuals and companies, suggesting what should be an equitable and fair process is instead characterised by pervasive economic and political patronage. Many of the identified institution-oriented interventions to promote skills development amongst the Province's Black communities, especially in terms of strengthening best business practices and individuals' and companies' capacities to compete for large tender opportunities, were perceived to be ineffective or requiring greater financial and political commitment. There is a strong perception that Indians, in addition to the structural advantages, are also favoured by existing policy provisions in the Provincial business environment at the expense of Africans. Discussions, for instance, focused upon the racialised character of economic competition throughout KZN, especially in terms of access to government tenders, economic opportunities and financial capital. These tensions

were observable between the province's Black and Indian communities, as well as between South Africans and foreign nationals residing in KZN.

***Relations between government and citizens under pressure:*** Corruption in the public sector constituted a focal point in exacerbating tensions throughout the Province. Corruption, in both political and economic spheres of public service and private sector, manifested in the poor distribution of resources, in poor service delivery, compromised decision-making, irregular procurement, and ultimately in the diminished legitimacy of institutions. Perceived gaps in communication between the Provincial government and citizens further exacerbated the threats relating to the lack of accountability in public governance. Slow responses to citizens' grievances, intermittent communication and dialogue, especially in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public policy initiatives were central to these challenges. Further, lack of coherent action between different government departments was also cited by participants as weakening efforts to strengthen social cohesion.

**Societal Threats:** Participants highlighted the entrenchment of negative, identity-driven perceptions within and between communities as societal threats to social cohesion. Virtually all of the literature on social cohesion, ranging from Tabane and Human-Vogel (2010) and Green and Janmaat (2011) to the World Bank (2012), OECD (2011), and Struwig et al (2012) underscore the importance of shared values, belonging, and consensus in forging a cohesive society. However, the urgency of promoting greater levels of socio-cultural cohesion should not explicitly translate into a need for articulating one single all-inclusive identity. KZN remains a diverse province, rich in various cultures, identities, and histories. Whereas some support exists for the forging of a single South African identity based on shared heritage, values, and beliefs, such an effort is weakened by the entrenchment of profound socio-economic inequalities and the heightened competition over political power and influence, which was explicitly perceived by participants in the study to underpin how socio-economic opportunities and resources are distributed. Amongst the identified societal threats to social cohesion, the following should receive the most urgent consideration:

***Perceptions, stigmas, and biases:*** Whether prejudices are based on the markers of language, race, class, or geography, their prevalence within individuals and communities highlights stark divisions concerning who benefits from the current

structures of society in KZN, and who is left on the margins. Whereas certain prejudices result from unaddressed structural socio-economic legacies, they are further reinforced and exacerbated by the decisions and policies implemented during the democratic era. These prejudices constitute significant threats to progress regardless of whether they emerge from factual and evidence-based conclusions or from individuals' and communities' lived experiences and perceptions of society at large. Negative prejudices, especially along identity lines, represent the lowest common denominators for many individuals across society's broader spectrum. Whereas each person's experiences may differ, these prejudices can unite and mobilise communities rapidly in the context of disproportionate and undue social marginalisation and isolation.

These threats, amongst others, in their totality contribute towards prevalent feelings of marginalisation and exclusion throughout the Province. Whether premised on specific economic grievances, broader contestations over political and civic governance, or feelings that the government and society at large benefit certain individuals and not others, various communities and interest groups throughout KZN do not yet see the realisation of a socially cohesive society.

Our investigation further established that the various threats to social cohesion are in fact multi-dimensional, interrelated, and mutually reinforcing. Structural socio-economic challenges constitute the foundation of threats to social cohesion, but also influence, perpetuate, and exacerbate distinct institutional and societal threats and grievances. These threats, in large part, manifest as a direct result of large degrees of inequity and exclusion, as well as heightened competition over limited economic opportunities and resources. If left unattended the structural threats, which include socio-economic inequalities, poverty, inequitable access to quality education, unemployment and the lasting legacy of apartheid spatial planning, may in the medium-term result in higher levels of social unrest and deprivation, together with their attendant challenges. In the longer-term, government and society become increasingly vulnerable to stagnant and diminishing human capital, a diminishing consumer base and various social ills associated with social exclusion.

There is another dimension of inequality that is specific to countries in the process of development, namely the tenuous position of the emergent middle strata, in the case of South Africa affecting especially the Coloured and African groups. Analysts have shown how the

application of the term ‘middle class’ to a society such as South Africa’s is not congruent with its use in the developed world. This is because the incomes characteristics of ‘middle class’ in South Africa represent merely a middle band between the rich and poor extremes. In OECD member countries, for example, ‘middle class’ is representative of higher levels of income and high levels of education and skills. The emergence of this ‘middle income group’ in developing states such as South Africa, furthermore, tends to have its own dynamic, resulting in new forms of social anomie or dislocation characterised by high levels of indebtedness, relative poverty of new entrants to this group compared with their established, often White counterparts, pressures of maintaining costly lifestyles, combined with expectations from extended family, and other financial strains. It is important to note that disquiet from this class, broadly conceived, is important to take note of, as similarly to the traditionally conceived ‘middle class’, it is still able to influence the content and tone of public discourse through engagement with traditional and social media, for example.

Heightened prejudices and intolerant attitudes, whether in evidence along lines of language, race, class, ethnicity, or geography, emerge from individuals’ lived experiences and perceptions that narrow identity markers limit their social and economic opportunities. Similarly, urgent threats emerging from governance institutions, such as the racialised economic competition and compromised relations between government and citizens, heightened competition for political power, and anger over corruption and maladministration, emerge in direct relation to the realities that certain individuals continue to benefit disproportionately over others.

With the Province’s current widespread socio-economic inequalities as a foundation, and compromised relations between the citizenry and the government as factors that compound these inequalities, the continued replication and reinforcement of negative prejudices within and between communities as well as between the populace and the government, threaten to motivate more communities and interest groups to mobilise to make their voices heard and combat their lived experiences of social stratification and marginalisation.

It is crucial to acknowledge the complexity of these challenges and the interrelated ways in which structural, institutional, and societal threats manifest and amplify each other. Further, recent examples of collective mobilisation, racist and xenophobic rhetoric, and violent outbursts across KZN’s communities highlight the gravity of these threats with respect to achieving greater social cohesion, and more broadly, to achieving widespread stability and

prosperity throughout the province. Although at present, these threats have only resulted in isolated, but nonetheless serious, outbreaks of violent mobilisation, the potential for further unrest remains a real and present concern.

These challenges become all the more pressing upon recognition that the Provincial Government, and all of KZN society, is in a race against time to resolve these complex challenges. Current trends highlight that in the upcoming years, the Province and South Africa alike will confront increasing social, economic, and environmental pressures. The exponential increase of the country's population, rapid and unplanned urbanisation, technological demands and environmental degradation (especially reduced rainfall and higher cereal prices) will impede efforts to ensure that all persons of KZN can be provided with basic services. Structurally-rooted skills deficits and sustained levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality will only amplify the disparities between those citizens who can ensure their basic needs are met and the many more who will be affected negatively in the years to come. All of these dynamics point to the urgent need to resolve the underlying socio-economic challenges as a meaningful step in promoting greater social cohesion.

These conclusions, in many respects, echo those reached by both the HSRC and MISTRA in their recent studies on social cohesion within South Africa. Struwig et al (2012) highlight the interrelated and dynamic ways in which economic, politico-civic, and socio-cultural dimensions of social cohesion manifest in and exacerbate one another, whereas the recently undertaken MISTRA (2014) study concludes, "nation formation and social cohesion cannot be divorced from the economic and material needs and realities of a society" (MISTRA, 2014: 214). Many of the identified threats contained in this report are similarly echoed in the matrix of threats and challenges<sup>1</sup> developed by the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) (2012: 35-36) in its 2012 "National Strategy for Developing an Inclusive and a Cohesive South African Society".

An important discussion must also revolve around the role of the KZN Provincial Government in striving to attain greater social cohesion. It remains important to acknowledge that the Provincial Government is an active and concerned stakeholder on these issues and has undertaken tangible policy efforts across many sectors to redress the systematic socio-

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<sup>1</sup> The identified threats include: socio-economic growth and transformation, unemployment, poverty and inequality, health, education, housing and land, crime and safety, gender, youth, xenophobia, corruption and service delivery, and social support. (DAC, 2012: 35-36)

economic inequalities that lie at the heart of these identified threats. From long term development trajectory based on the Provincial Growth and Development Plan 2011-2030 to targeted short and medium term interventions, for example Operation Sukuma Sakhe, the Provincial Government is working to redress many of the socio-economic challenges at the heart of the identified threats to social cohesion. Having said this, the evident strain in relations between the government and certain quarters of the citizenry unintentionally exacerbate many of the underlying fault lines and tensions that government policy is striving to address. Widespread concerns about the lack of government communication during policy development periods, as well as an inconsistent approach to engaging citizens on the intentions, scheduled timeframes, and expected outcomes of key policy initiatives engender feelings of a growing gap between the people and the government.

The discussions with various stakeholders, drawn from a variety of sectors of KZN society, yielded spirited engagements with people who have thought at length about social cohesion in the Province. It is clear that participants were most concerned about socio-economic inequalities in KZN. They viewed these inequalities as the source of many tensions spanning economic, political and cultural life. Yet along with socio-economic inequality, as evidenced in differential quality of education and employment as well as the scourge of corruption, there was an underlying concern with the moral direction of society. A number of participants raised the issue that the trauma South Africa, and in particular KZN, experienced during the 1980s and 1990s, is unresolved, and this has consequences in the levels of violence exhibited in society today. Violence is also, unfortunately, rewarded with media attention, and government action.

Crucially, the population of KZN desires to be heard, engaged, and embraced as legitimate stakeholders across a wide range of economic, political, social, and cultural policy issues. This report acknowledges that public policy processes are often not perfect, and that government will frequently be faced with complex choices, decisions that cannot please all stakeholders and interests, while unintended consequences of these processes may further influence desired and expected outcomes. It is when marginalisation becomes entrenched that individuals feel they have no other option than to undertake public action to be heard and engaged. While peaceful public action must remain a vital component of South Africa's vibrant democratic society, the potential for violent outbreaks increases as individuals and communities become increasingly desperate to protect their inalienable rights and to be

included in the society of KZN. Building greater social cohesion is dependent on greater societal inclusion long before sustained public action turns violent.

It is in this light that the Special Committee presents the following recommendations for consideration.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- **Revitalising policy provisions to promote more equitable economic development:** Central to the pursuit of greater social cohesion is the building of an inclusive and equitable economy. This requires an appropriate skills base, the injection of financial capital into SMMEs, greater articulation between SMMEs and larger businesses and institutions, and the reinforcement of public awareness campaigns to promote mechanisms and institutions that support skills development programmes and offer financial grants to fledgling businesses. Skills are essential for ensuring that individuals are aware of and can harness best business practices to operate the administrative and financial competencies of their businesses. These initiatives require sustained investment, over the immediate and long-term, into the Province's schools (at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels) as well as through extra-curricular support that strengthens mathematics, sciences, and financial literacy skills. The increase of cohesion and collaboration between SMMEs and larger businesses, across industries, remains essential for domesticating supply chains and thereby promoting business opportunities that both provide individuals a meaningful wage and contribute added value to the domestic economy.
- **Developing a more transparent and equitable tender system:** Greater transparency regarding the awarding of tenders is required to undercut any suspicion of corruption or wrongdoing in the area of government procurement. Transparency and merit should underpin the tender process right up to the awarding of the tender, and reasons should be publicised for the failure and success of bids. The Provincial Government should look specifically into the circumstances surrounding the repeated awarding of tenders to one individual or firm. Corporate actors and the government must make explicit commitments to the transfer of skills. Conditions could be stipulated in tender awards, for example, not only requiring the participation of Black companies, but also

specifying the areas of skill they should be exposed to. For example, if a bank is awarded a government tender, exposing Black lawyers to banking law and thereby developing their skills could be a condition of the award of the tender.

- **Promoting peace education, building a culture of mutual acceptance, and encouraging trauma healing:** It is recommended that the KZN Provincial Government provide resources for peace education programmes in the Province. Civil society could play a helpful role in implementing such programmes. In addition, projects should be initiated at schools, community centres, religious institutions, and sports clubs that involve all South Africans, both young and old, in designing, implementing, and championing programmes which celebrate and embrace diversity in culture and society. Further, there is an urgent need to make widely available processes such as the “healing of memories” workshops, in which people are able to tell their stories of the violence they have experienced in a sympathetic environment of trust. While there are civil society and faith-based organisations which can and do provide such opportunities, in order to upscale these to the level needed to make an impact, we urge the provincial government to budget significant resources and to give every encouragement and support for the implementation of a coordinated plan.
- **Revamping the government’s social cohesion strategy:** The Provincial Government should spearhead the undertaking of a comprehensive 20-Year Review for the KZN Province, similar to the 20 Year Review undertaken in 2014 by The Presidency of South Africa, highlighting key achievements and shortcomings in key social, economic, and political sectors. The Province should further seek to undertake a multi-stakeholder dialogue towards developing a comprehensive and medium term Provincial Strategy for Social Cohesion. This strategy should take into account economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions of social cohesion. This strategy should be aligned with the frameworks and indicators contained within the Provincial Growth and Development Plan 2011-2030. A revised Provincial Strategy for Social Cohesion should be located in the Office of the Premier as a “special project”. Within Departments of Arts and Culture, for example, social cohesion projects end up very often being seen as cultural activities, while research, and the consultations leading to



this Report, have shown that these issues are far wider, deeply embedded in political, social and economic issues.

- **Strengthening Communication and Dialogue within KZN:** The Provincial Government should strengthen its communications strategy especially concerning stakeholder engagement during the periods of policy formulation. This should include increasing the use of the Provincial Government website, newspaper advertisements, social media tools, and email web-blasts to explain the intentions and anticipated outcomes of specific policy initiatives. The KZN Provincial Government should provide updates on key socio-economic policy frameworks and initiatives, highlighting its expectations and giving timelines for progress towards desired achievements. This would promote greater transparency and accountability within Government. These updates should be apolitical. A prerequisite for social cohesion is that communities should have legitimate avenues for expressing community grievances. Government officials should carefully record their engagement with communities and report back to them on the actions taken, indicating that grievances are taken seriously. When such issues are not promptly dealt with there is a likelihood of protests, which should be regarded as another legitimate way of addressing grievances.
  
- **Conduct on-going dialogues with societal institutions and stakeholders that can support the strengthening of social cohesion:** Participants in our discussions identified a number of societal institutions and stakeholders that play a positive and constructive role in strengthening social cohesion throughout KZN. Dialogues should strive both to engage these communities on policy and community issues surrounding social cohesion, as well as promote values of tolerance and equality. Suggested institutions that should be targeted for such dialogues include:
  - Political parties
  - Media
  - Religious institutions and formations
  - Educational institutions
  - Big Business
  - Community leaders

All of the recommendations outlined above can be implemented through embracing a new paradigm on the part of the provincial government, business, workers and other social partners. However, such efforts may flounder if this approach is not manifest at the national level. As such, the provincial government and its social partners should also take it upon themselves to promote this paradigm in their interaction with peers in other provinces and the national government.

## 2 Introduction

During 2013, allegations were made and dissatisfaction was expressed in the popular media with regard to differential treatment concerning access to resources and services in KZN. These allegations were perceived as threats to social cohesion by the Executive Council of the KZN Provincial Government. The allegations were salient particularly against the historical backdrop of bedevilled race relations in the Province – a legacy of the colonial and apartheid past. Consequently, the provincial cabinet appointed a Special Committee on Social Cohesion to investigate the threats to social cohesion in the Province, the context from which they emerge, and the possible actions that can be instituted to deal with these challenges.

The terms of reference for the Special Committee are encapsulated in a Cabinet Memorandum cited below:

“This Committee should be made up of respected public figures with a broad mandate to research, investigate, consult and report on the nature of these threats to social cohesion, the underlying factors giving rise to the same, and make recommendations that would strengthen government’s overall response”.

The Special Committee comprised Prof Paulus Zulu (Director: Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit, UKZN) (Chair), Prof Cheryl Potgieter (Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Head of College: Humanities, UKZN), Mr Paddy Kearney (Chairperson, Denis Hurley Centre Trust), and Mr Vasu Gounden (Founder and Executive Director: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes). The Special Committee was supported by a Secretariat of five staff. In order to fulfil the above-mentioned mandate, the Special Committee undertook an investigation comprising interviews and stakeholder consultations over an 8-week period, accompanied by extensive literature and media surveys to contextualise the study. The findings of the Special Committee’s investigation are contained in the report that follows.

### 3 Context for the Investigation into Social Cohesion

The allegations referred to above must be viewed within a specific historical context. For almost three and a half centuries South African society experienced systematic inequalities whose foundations lay in a system where access to the country's resources was limited to a select number of individuals whose status was determined according to race. This form of closure created a hierarchical arrangement within society with Whites as the country's rulers at the top of the social, economic and political hierarchy and Africans at the bottom, while Indians and Coloureds occupied an intermediate but nonetheless disadvantaged stratum. The result of this political arrangement was a growing social distance across race resulting in relative deprivation on one side and defensive forms of intra-racial solidarity on the other, to protect whatever advantage the contrived groupings perceived they had gained. While growing political consciousness bridged the gap especially between the intermediate (Indian and Coloured) and bottom (African) strata in the social hierarchy, the dominant political arrangements kept the divisions alive particularly at the level of allocation of the key resources, especially economic opportunities. The onset of democracy and the new socio-economic dispensation found this system intact and the resultant tensions almost intractable. The unique demographics of KZN, characterised by a large community of South Africans of Indian descent, relative to all of the other provinces in South Africa, rendered these tensions markedly conspicuous.

Efforts by the new democratic government to resolve these systemic inequalities, especially within the economic sphere, have created new dynamics marked by both aspirational and decremental<sup>2</sup> forms of deprivation: those at the bottom of the social and resource hierarchy feel entitled to more than they are getting, and those at the top feel they are getting less than they used to. This is not to deny that differential access to resources still exists empirically, but rather to provide a conceptual and contextual framework within which the tensions play out.

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<sup>2</sup>These terms were utilized by the social scientist Ted Robert Gurr to mean the following: decremental deprivation occurs when value expectations remain the same, in spite of a decline in capabilities. Aspirational deprivation, meanwhile, refers to a situation where value expectations rise, but capabilities remain the same. See Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why men rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

## 4 Understandings of Social Cohesion

Our understanding of social cohesion is adopted from that provided by the HSRC: “The definition is often contested but we see social cohesion as what holds societies together. The key component is social justice. This is the measure of the extent of fairness and equity in terms of access to and participation in the political, socio- economic and cultural aspects of society” (HSRC: 2004).

According to the South African Government, social cohesion refers to “the degree of social integration and inclusion in communities and society at large and the extent to which mutual solidarity finds expression among individuals and communities” (Department of Arts and Culture, 2012a).

As a descriptive term social cohesion refers to the extent to which a society is coherent, united and functional in providing an environment within which citizens can flourish (The Presidency: 2005). We note that social cohesion is often investigated in times of crisis: however, we are of the opinion that it is important to examine and activate these issues of social cohesion outside of community and societal crisis.

The definition of social cohesion utilized by the Special Committee for this study, derived from a review of the literature, is as follows:

*Social cohesion can be characterized as a fluid continuum of community relations, between individuals, and between individuals and their institutions, that strives for a significantly higher level of equality and mutual acceptance.*

This definition highlights the relational aspect of social cohesion, emphasizing horizontal relations between individuals throughout society, the vertical relations between the individuals and communities with their communal institutions (such as the family and faith-based groups), and the relations between citizens and government. Further, the definition is anchored upon the principles of equality and mutual acceptance, which hold broad resonance in the South African context.

## 5 Literature Review

Social cohesion is widely acknowledged in academic literature to be a complex concept as evidenced by the many ways in which it is defined and analysed. While the concept's origins can be traced back to French sociologist Emile Durkheim (who studied society holistically), social cohesion's meaning today is widely debated. Durkheim's position was that the more complex societies become, the greater the multiplicity of values inherent to these societies. This was found to be challenging for social cohesion. Analytically, the concept of social cohesion is characterized by two broad discourses, namely those from the academic and social science disciplines (mainly sociology and social psychology), and those from the public policy world (Chan et al, 2006). The two discourses are distinct but interrelated and mutually reinforcing: the academic discourse sharpens the policy debates while policy gives relevance and meaning to the academic discussion of social cohesion.

The concept of social cohesion has been researched and interrogated extensively within the South African context. The various analytical studies cover a broad scope, from assessing the country's post-conflict society (Bradshaw, 2009), the realm of state institutions (Chipkin and Ngqulunga, 2008), the role of sport in encouraging social cohesion (Allen, 2013 and Høglund and Sundberg, 2008), to the place of social cohesion within the education sector (Woodrooffe, 2011 and Tabane and Human-Vogel, 2010). These studies are varied in their methodologies and conclusions. While Chipkin and Ngqulunga (2008) place emphasis on the functioning of state bodies in building social cohesion, Barolsky (2013) proffers equality as the *sine qua non* of social cohesion. Tabane and Human-Vogel (2010) assert that a sense of belonging and respect are as important in cultivating social cohesion. South African research institutions such as the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection (MISTRA) have engaged the concept of social cohesion extensively. The HSRC builds upon the definition employed by Green and Janmaat (2011) to construct a conceptual framework for measuring social cohesion through subjective and objective measures across South Africa's economic, socio-cultural and civic domains (Struwig et al, 2012). MISTRA's recent report analyses social cohesion as a quality that is interdependent with nation formation, and examines how South Africans interact in building an inclusive and stable nation and an inclusive and equitable society (MISTRA, 2014: 18).

## 5.1 Social Cohesion Initiatives in South Africa

South Africa provides a unique context for the study of social cohesion. The legacies of colonialism and apartheid as well as the transition to a democratic society have made South Africa a prime candidate for the engagement of questions of social cohesion. Questions relating to social cohesion have been asked in different ways since, and even prior to, 1994. Examples of this include the framing of the 1996 Constitution and its Bill of Rights; the truth and reconciliation process; discussions around nation-building and moral regeneration; and the emergence of the National Development Plan as a means of promoting socio-economic transformation. Central to all of these discussions have been debates about how to build a more inclusive, equitable, non-racial and prosperous society. It is in this light that this section discusses how the South African government, both at the Provincial and National levels, has sought to address issues of social cohesion.

The histories of colonialism and apartheid in South Africa, and the ways in which the country's democratic administrations have sought to address their damaging legacies, provide greater urgency to assessing how social cohesion is understood in and across South African society. The National Summit on Social Cohesion, the government's flagship event concerning social cohesion, took place in June 2012 as a culmination of government research studies dating back to 2004. Following from this, Provinces were tasked with crafting their own social cohesion strategies. Emerging out of this Summit was the "National Strategy for Developing an Inclusive and a Cohesive South African Society", issued by the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC), though with the recognition that social cohesion is a multi-sector effort.

The National Strategy defines social cohesion as "the degree of social integration and inclusion in communities and society at large and the extent to which mutual solidarity finds expression of itself among individuals and communities." (DAC 2012:20). The National Strategy also emphasises the interrelationship of social cohesion and nation-building, noting that social cohesion and nation-building occupy both community based and nationally-oriented spheres of society. The Strategy also identifies a number of development indicators that are identified to contribute further to social cohesion and nation-building, including:

economic growth and transformation; unemployment; poverty and inequality; housing and land; health; uneven access to quality education; crime and safety; gender equality; discrimination; youth development; perceptions of corruption and basic

service delivery; social support; and, active citizenship and identity. (DAC 2012b: 25-33).

National government has also initiated a number of more specific steps in support of its desire to assess and increase the levels of social cohesion in South African society. These include:

- The Presidency's Fifteen Year Review, which listed 'building social cohesion and state legitimacy' as a key element of the government's development strategy;
- The National Planning Commission's Vision 2030, which underscores the importance of social cohesion as an 'anchor strategy' for economic growth, jobs and a capable and developmental state. Broadening 'social cohesion and unity while redressing inequities of the past' is also outlined as an 'enabling milestone' of the Plan (National Planning Commission, 2011).
- The government's Programme of Action for the Social Cluster, which has also included social cohesion as one of its core priority actions. Through the Department of Arts and Culture, this cluster commissioned a study titled "Social Cohesion and Social Justice in South Africa", published in 2010 (The Presidency, 2010).

Initiatives of the Province are also currently housed within the 'Social' category of the Province's Growth and Development Strategy (KZN Provincial Planning Commission, 2011). For instance, the 2014 Budget Speech of the Provincial Department of Arts and Culture states: "It is through appreciation of our cultures that we can transform society and build a united nation." In this regard, the Department has undertaken to intensify its Social Cohesion Programme and to endeavour to reach out to all cultural backgrounds. The Department is also using its Social Cohesion Programme to assess the role played by the youth during the Hammarsdale political violence of the late 1980s and 1990s. The Department's Programme is aimed at instilling a sense of patriotism through, for instance, its *Ziqhenye Ngezwe Lakho* (Be Proud of Your Country) campaign (KZN Provincial Department of Arts and Culture, 2014).

The Provincial Department of Education, meanwhile, has co-curricular learning as one of the ten strategic drivers of its vision "Social Cohesion and Integration of Schools". For example, one of the events listed under this initiative include the National Choral Eisteddfod Competition. Part of the Government's plan also includes the staging of indigenous music



competitions as part of schools' arts and culture competitions in one of the Province's districts (Amajuba). "We will forge closer ties with the Department of Sports, Arts and Culture and other stakeholders to strengthen our nation building project through social cohesion by promoting the values of the Constitution and deepening the culture of human rights and democracy" (KZN Provincial Department of Education, 2014: 16).

These initiatives take place within a particular historical and socio-economic context, which is discussed in the following section.

## 6 The Policy Environment

The issue of social cohesion in KZN cannot be separated from the historical and socio-economic context of the Province and of South Africa. This section will therefore interrogate the pre- and post-1994 policy environments in order to contextualise the issues that are salient to social cohesion today.

### 6.1 Pre-1994 Policy Environment of South Africa and KZN: Socio-economic and Political Legacies of Apartheid

Understanding the historical political economy of the Province serves to situate and contextualize the threats to be outlined in Section 8 of the Report. The successive colonial and apartheid governments' social engineering of capital, skills and opportunities to the exclusive benefit of the country's White citizens has resulted in the forms of exclusion prominent throughout KZN and the country at large.

Industrialisation and commercialization of the economy led to a spatial mixing of races, bringing the “native” and “Indian” questions into the South African political economy. The formation of Union in 1910, which ended external colonial control over the country, created the platform for White minority governments to codify exclusionary land, economic, and racial practices over Black South Africans.<sup>3</sup> The 1913 Native Land Act, among others, solidified dispossession of the majority, and together with the Poll Tax, created the basis for the supply of cheap labour and provided the basis for the architecture of spatial segregation that would later underpin apartheid. For Africans, the most catastrophic provisions of the 1913 Land Act were that it prohibited them from buying or hiring land in 93% of South Africa (SA History Online, website). The Act also prohibited ‘squatting’ to stop share-cropping, thus eliminating Black tenants and replacing them with Black servants or labourers who were not allowed to lease land in White areas. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 further contributed to these divisions by excluding African and Coloured labourers from the legal definition of ‘employee’ and thus restricting their collective bargaining rights. The Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946 contributed to divisions by limiting the areas in Natal where Indians could purchase and own land. Coloureds were

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<sup>3</sup> The use of the term ‘Black’ in this Report denotes those South Africans of mainly African descent, except where otherwise stated. It should be noted that in 2014, South Africa’s National Parliament passed the Black Economic Empowerment Amendment Bill that defines ‘black people’ as a “generic term which means Africans, Coloureds and Indians” (Government Gazette. Act No.46 of 2013: Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Amendment Act, 2013).

specifically affected by the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No.55 of 1949, which sought to calm White fears about the growing ‘infiltration’ by Coloureds into the White population group through marriage. This fear was unfounded; however, as only 75 ‘mixed’ marriages were recorded at the time the law was passed (South African History Online, website). The Group Areas Act of 1950 institutionalized apartheid’s spatial segregation as South Africa’s legally codified racial groupings, classified by the Population Registration Act of 1950, were required to settle in areas determined by the government. The 1953 Bantu Education Act and related legislation for Coloured and Indian communities similarly became a cornerstone of the apartheid project, as Black South Africans were accorded inferior education, tailored for subordinate roles in the colonial and apartheid political economy. For Africans, in particular, the stated “aim was to prevent [them] receiving an education that would lead them to aspire to positions they wouldn't be allowed to hold in society” (SA History Online, Website).

In addition, through the implementation of policy in both education and job reservation, the apartheid state constructed a hierarchy of oppression that was designed to ‘divide and rule’. This entailed the imposition of exclusions in terms of skills that Africans could acquire, while promoting the acquisition of certain higher-paying artisanal skills for Coloureds and Indians. The 1911 Mines and Works Act No 12, for example, permitted the granting of certificates of competency for a number of skilled mining occupations to Whites and Coloureds only (South African History Online, Website). This variegated treatment constituted a key pillar of this ‘divide-and-rule’ approach, and had a number of significant consequences. In part, it created a degree of mutual distrust and suspicion among the Black communities (comprised of Africans, Indians and Coloureds); as well as a sense of fear within the Coloured and Indian communities that the empowerment of Africans would usurp the quasi-privileges (the larger crumbs from the master’s table) accorded to them by the system. The system did succeed to some extent in this regard; but the impulse for political freedom tended to trump all else and, combined with mass mobilisation and education, solidarity across these communities was attained in struggle. This included campaigns over many decades during the 20th century, and the rejection of the ‘toy telephones’ of the 1980s reflected in the Tri-cameral Parliament. One of the critical lessons from this experience is that such solidarity could not be assumed and must be something for which society actively works.

It is in part a consequence of these apartheid policies and practices, as well as deliberate and opportunistic acts of racist mobilisation, that relations between the African and Indian

communities throughout the Province had been somewhat strained by economic hardship – from time to time flaring up in conflicts of varying intensity. For instance, the tensions of 1949 resulting in the Afro-Indian riots where the final toll was 137 dead (one European, 53 Indians and 83 Africans), and 1,883 injured (30 Europeans, 1,085 Africans and 768 Indians) are a case in point (Ramamurthi, 1994: 544). In addition, 1,532 dwellings and 710 shops and three factories were damaged or destroyed, figures believed to be too low by both Indians and Africans (Ramamurthi, 1994: 544). The South African Government’s enquiry into the riots concluded that these were “a spontaneous outburst of long-standing grievances” (SA History Online, website). This was contested by various leading social scientists of the time, who concluded that the riots appeared to be “too well-organised to have been spontaneous” (Ramamurthi, 1994: 543). Indeed, “the Durban riots were not an expression of permanent antagonism between Indians and native Africans but an explosion of deeper frustrations in a society where rapid urbanization and forced proletarianisation had subjected large sections of both communities to ‘conscious poverty’, which meant inability to pay for a home or for adequate food and clothing” (Ramamurthi, 1994: 543).

Indeed, the National Party both orchestrated and exploited divisions between Africans and Indians in an effort to win more votes, as evidenced by the Nationalists’ threat to repatriate Indians and give their possessions to the Africans. It was noted that there was little retaliation for the attacks on Indians by the affected communities – the working classes who lived among the Africans – and that action was “taken by hired gangs at the call of the well-to-do” (Ramamurthi, 1994: 544). Following the riots, the “conditions of rivalry” in which African-Indian relations continued “arose from the differential discrimination to which they were subjected” (Ramamurthi, 1994: 546). As Maurice Webb, who was at the time Head of the South African Institute of Race Relations, noted, “While a man of one race has to carry a pass and another not; one may purchase land, another is prohibited; one may go to a cinema and another may not; there is sure to be resulting tension” (cited in Ramamurthi, 1994: 546). In the aftermath of 1949, it was clear to many that the remedy for racial tensions lay in reducing, if not fully removing, discrimination between the communities. As this was exclusively in the hands of the White minority of the time, the leaders of the two communities adopted the next-best strategy, namely to educate their respective communities and cultivate the forging of bonds. This took place primarily in the political sphere.

Another significant component of the apartheid government’s strategy of separate socio-economic and political development rested upon the realization and development of the so-

called homelands: each ethnically-codified Black population group throughout the country was stripped of its South African citizenship and relegated to small patches of predominantly rural land that were ultimately envisioned to be institutionalized into quasi-independent administrative political entities. The KwaZulu Homeland, comprised of approximately twenty-nine major and another forty-one minor fragmented enclaves, was scattered widely over the Natal region. The homeland system precipitated mass disenfranchisement and forced removals of Africans from urban areas and further contributed to the migrant labour system. The homeland areas were mired in poverty and infrastructural underdevelopment, and residents were almost exclusively dependent on pensions and the remittances from the migrant labour system for survival. This policy was combined with the introduction of various apartheid political institutions for Coloured and Indian communities, culminating in the creation of the Tri-Cameral Parliamentary system in 1984, which afforded the veneer of increased representation to Coloured and Indian South Africans.

Political violence was a significant dimension of political life in the KwaZulu homeland throughout the 1980s especially against the broader backdrop of heightened resistance to the apartheid system. It is estimated that political violence in the Province, mainly between supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the African National Congress (ANC)-aligned United Democratic Front (UDF), and later between the IFP and the ANC itself, claimed some 20,000 lives from 1984 well into the 1990s. As has been well documented, the three months preceding the April 1994 elections were particularly violent in the Province, with some 1,000 people being killed (Taylor, 2002).

At the same time as the apartheid government conjured up all manner of institutions to consolidate the disenfranchisement of the Black community, resistance against the system as a whole intensified and solidarity across the apartheid divides was strengthened, rendering apartheid unworkable and South Africa ungovernable. This reached an apex in early 1990, when the apartheid Government undertook a series of measures, including the unbanning of all previously outlawed political parties, and the release of political prisoners that sparked the beginning of an inclusive negotiated transition towards a new Constitution. The culminating political settlement brought about an Interim Constitution, elected assembly and governance structure and the holding of elections based on universal suffrage. Attached to this settlement

were compromises – the so-called ‘sunset clauses’<sup>4</sup> – that somewhat limited the intensity and pace of transformation in the earlier years. Following the 1994 general elections, South Africa’s first democratic government was faced with the fundamental task of addressing the structural legacies of apartheid and promoting social and economic transformation throughout the country in a gradual, orderly, and peaceful manner (South Africa History Online, website).

The unbundling of legalised apartheid did not, however, automatically guarantee the end of the political, economic, and social exclusion caused by apartheid. While the 1994 general elections ushered in a new political era in South Africa – a period characterized by the enactment of a series of human rights for every South African – there is still some way to go in bringing about economic and social transformation in the country. The pace of such change in various parts of the country was also dependent on the permutations regarding the orientation and commitment of the political parties in office in the various provinces.

Overall, the combination of all these factors has influenced the levels of patience about the depth of change since 1994, with President Jacob Zuma declaring that the next period should be an era of ‘radical economic transformation’, representing, in broad terms, a new phase of the transition to a more equitable society. It is in this context that the Provincial Plan of Action seeks to initiate progress toward the Province’s 2030 vision, “A prosperous Province, with healthy, secure and skilled people, acting as a gateway to Africa and the World” (Mchunu, 2014).

## 6.2 The Post-1994 Policy Environment of South Africa and KZN: Accomplishments and Shortcomings

The Preamble to the 1996 South African Constitution asserts that its overarching vision is to “heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights” (Preamble: 1996 South African Constitution). Key socio-economic rights include the rights to freedom of occupation and trade, the right to access adequate housing, health care services, sufficient food and water, social security and assistance, and a basic education. Guided by the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, a number

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<sup>4</sup> A ‘sunset clause’ is a provision terminating sections of law after a certain date, unless these laws are further extended by new laws or provisions (SA History online).

of policies introduced by South Africa's successive democratic dispensations have sought to redress many of the socio-economic inequalities that burden South African society.

Some key examples include:

- Affirmative action, including allocation of economic opportunities through instruments such as Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE); and
- Broader macro- and micro-economic frameworks, and general policies of social transformation including the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA) framework, the New Growth Path, and the National Development Plan (NDP).

### 6.3 Efforts to transform the Demographic Profile of the Economy

Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) is one of the instruments utilized by the South African government to de-racialise the South African economy. The B-BBEE Act, No.53 of 2003, was promulgated to advance the economic empowerment of Black people in the South African economy (DTI, website). According to the Act, B-BBEE is defined as 'economic empowerment of all Black people including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas through diverse but integrated socioeconomic strategies' (B-BBEE Act, 2003). 'Black' in this instance is understood to encompass Africans, Coloureds and Indians – all of whom were excluded from the mainstream of the South African economy under apartheid.

However, given the hierarchy of oppression outlined above in Section 6.1, the application of this policy has, in its detail, been a cause of much controversy. On the one hand, all who were deliberately excluded and marginalised under apartheid and colonialism have the right to lay claim to the corrective actions envisaged in the Act – and this designation includes White women. Yet because of the fact that Africans were relegated to the lowest rung in the apartheid socio-economic ladder, and because they are numerically in the majority, there is an expectation that they should be prioritised in the allocation of resources and opportunities. At the same time, those in the Black community (as well as some other explicitly-designated groups such as White women and Chinese South Africans) who were somewhat 'more advantaged' in relative terms under apartheid are in a better position, through access to

capital and skills, to take advantage of the openings provided by transformative policies, and can then appear, to the rest, as being favoured.

This is one of the conundrums that practical implementation of B-BBEE policies and practices throw up – one of the triggers of the tensions that have emerged in the past few years. Part of the irony in this regard is the fact that these tensions develop among those who are marginalised, and focus is diverted from broader representation in the economy and the overwhelming imbalances in the economy, which are a legacy of apartheid social relations.

Prior to the enactment of the B-BBEE Act, No.53 of 2003, government measures to implement a development strategy for Black business were fragmented and dispersed. These measures included both legislative measures and departmental initiatives. Some of the legislative measures included: The Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act of 2000. This was one of four ‘Transformation Bills’ mandated by the 1996 Constitution (Iheduru, 2004: 9). Other laws included: The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2001, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997, Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994, Employment Equity Act of 1998, Competition Act of 1998 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996. In addition, most legislation enacted since 1994 obliges the government to ‘achieve equity and address historic imbalance’ in its implementation of new laws (Iheduru, 2004: 10). The National Empowerment Fund Act (1998) seeks to set aside 2% of the proceeds from the privatization of state assets in a trust for the benefit of previously disadvantaged individuals (PDIs) (Iheduru, 2004: 10). A number of other laws have been reviewed and updated in order to remove impediments to Black participation in the economy.

Government-level practices form a second level of state action to implement a Black empowerment strategy. The Constitution of South Africa provides the framework for this strategy by allowing for a government procurement policy that provides for categories of preference, and for the advancement or protection of persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination (Section 217) (Constitution, 1996). According to 2004 figures, the South African national government spent more than R180 billion annually purchasing goods from the private sector from a budget allocation then of approximately R332 billion (Iheduru, 2004: 10). This is more than half the government budget, and an enormous opportunity for National Government to transform the profile of the South African economy by supporting businesses with more diverse profiles, and from previously



disadvantaged groups. This is not a straightforward process, however, as submissions to the Special Committee and consultations it conducted revealed.

A third aspect of government measures to support Black empowerment is the privatization or ‘restructuring’ programme, embarked upon in 1996. Here, the South African government “has used its programme to advance BEE goals by requiring bidders for divested state assets to satisfy minimum ‘empowerment’ equity ownership or participation in the privatized company” (Iheduru, 2004: 11).

A fourth instrument utilized by South Africa’s post-apartheid governments to promote economic empowerment is the regulation of natural resources through the subsidization and protection of the energy and mining sectors. In 2000, six oil companies signed the Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Charter, committing to 25% Black ownership of the sector by 2014. The government also reserves 10% of every new gas exploration license for BEE companies (Iheduru, 2004: 11). In 2002, the Mining Industry Empowerment Charter followed. This had to be revised in 2010 due to slow transformation in the sector. Other instruments utilised by the government to implement the goal of economic transformation include the awarding of business licenses and establishment of quotas, and the provision of investment credit and stimulating the growth and development of a Black capital market.

Overall, the jury is still out on whether these policies have been effective. For instance, research by BUSA “found that, while White males represent just 6.7% of South Africa’s economically active population (EAP), they accounted for: 52% of board positions; 71.6% of executive directors; 42% of nonexecutive directors; 43.5% of independent nonexecutive directors; 51.4% of chairpersons; 76.2% of CEOs; and 75.7% of CFOs” (Creamer Media’s SA Economic Brief, February 2012).

Another major component of the government’s transformation strategy has been the attempt at land reform. This has been widely recognized as an unsuccessful venture, some 100 years after Black people were dispossessed of their land by the 1913 Land Act. The 2013 South Africa Survey conducted by the Institute for Race Relations (IRR) highlights that KZN comprises approximately 9,332,800 hectares of land: 50% of which is under the control of state organs while 46% is privately owned. Approximately 2.84 million hectares of the Province’s land is registered under the Ingonyama Trust, which is mandated to manage such land on behalf of the members of traditional communities that live there (Ingonyama Trust 2014). In KZN, 701,714 hectares of land, valued at over R4.5 billion, have been restored

through claims from 1995-2011, with 81,729 households and over 478,000 as the beneficiaries of these land restitution claims (IRR, 2014: 299). An additional R1.7 billion has been awarded to those beneficiaries who have opted for monetary compensation over the restoration of their land (IRR, 2014: 299). As with other parts of the country, KZN has not yet achieved its commitments in terms of land redistribution: the government has only redistributed 635,502 hectares of 1,031,821 hectares to over 74,000 beneficiaries, amounting to about 61.6% of its target (IRR, 2014: 301).

### 6.3.1 Affirmative Action

The Employment Equity Act, No.55 of 1998, was promulgated in order to address disparities in employment, occupation and income in the national labour market. The enactment of this law was a recognition that structural inequalities brought about by apartheid laws would not be addressed simply by repealing of these laws. The Employment Equity Act seeks both to prevent unfair discrimination in employment, and to bring about redress for past discrimination (Republic of South Africa, 1998). The Employment Equity Amendment Bill that was passed in 2013 tightened the provisions of the original Act with respect to the definition of ‘designated groups’, implementation timeframes, and stricter punitive measures for breaches, amongst other changes (Republic of South Africa, 2013).

### 6.3.2 Broader Macroeconomic Measures

The South African government’s specific interventions to redress socio-economic inequalities must also be situated within the broader economic frameworks guiding the National Government’s economic policies since 1994. A host of macro-economic challenges confronted South Africa’s first democratic government, such as high levels of poverty and unemployment amongst the country’s masses, the extreme concentration of economic capital within the hands of White South Africans, and the need to reintegrate South Africa’s economy into global markets following years of isolation and economic sanctions. To address these challenges, the government implemented a number of macro-economic strategies and economic policy visions with the ultimate goal of building South Africa as a thriving and sustainable society.

The first framework, the RDP, was launched in 1994 to address the significant socio-economic challenges in the immediate aftermath of apartheid. The RDP explicitly linked

reconstruction and development as unified processes, strategically integrating growth, development, reconstruction and redistribution into a coherent programme. The GEAR framework, introduced in 1996, sought to adapt the goals of the RDP to a rapidly evolving global economic environment and put forward an integrated framework seeking to expand South African trade and exports through trade liberalisation, increased foreign direct investment, reduced fiscal deficits, and the stabilisation of the South African Rand. The ASGI-SA framework (2006) sought to implement a series of integrated micro-economic interventions to support infrastructure investment, to devise industrial policies for the chemicals, precious metals, and textiles sectors (amongst others), to enhance skills development initiatives, to reduce the scale of South Africa's informal economy, and to improve administrative governance. The New Growth Path, introduced after the 2009 elections, placed a renewed emphasis on job creation and sought to promote greater social equity and economic competitiveness, mobilise domestic investment in employment-generating opportunities, and promote a strong social dialogue throughout the country for building employment-generating opportunities. Finally, the NDP takes a longer-term perspective on South Africa's economic growth and development by seeking to eliminate poverty and inequality by 2030 through building a capable, developmental state and enhancing the quality of service delivery, increasing formal employment and investment, while promoting greater worker productivity within the context of a people-centred economy (NDP, 2012: 1).

The KZN Provincial Government has also undertaken a comprehensive and long-term programme to strengthen and develop the Province's economy. *The Provincial Growth and Development Plan 2011-2030* serves as the centrepiece of these efforts. This development plan, which outlines an integrated framework for the Province's economic development until 2030, charts a pathway defined by seven long-term strategic goals. These are: 1) job creation; 2) human resource development; 3) human and community development; 4) strategic infrastructure; 5) response to climate change; 6) governance and policy; and, 7) spatial equity. (Provincial Planning Commission 2011: 11-12).

The Provincial Government's efforts to promote socio-economic transformation also include Operation Sukuma Sakhe (OSS), its flagship programme, intended to contribute to combatting poverty and promote community-based development. This pro-poor policy programme and service delivery model aim to promote greater integration and effectiveness

of immediate, medium, and long-term services provided by government departments, state-owned enterprises, business and civil society (KZN Provincial Government 2015a: 17).

In 2015, the Provincial Government also launched the KZN version of the *Back to Basics* Programme, building on the initiative of the National Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. Led by the Provincial MEC for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, the *Back to Basics* Programme focuses on strengthening local municipalities' efforts in creating decent living conditions, promoting good governance and public participation, ensuring sound financial management of public affairs, and building municipalities' administrative capacities (South African Government, 2014)

### 6.3.3 South Africa and Recent Economic Dynamics

Over the past 20 years South Africa has achieved considerable progress considering the state of its economy in 1994. The country nonetheless continues to struggle with the challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality. Real per capita GDP growth averaged 3.2 % from 1994 – 2012, with the country's GDP rising from USD 136 billion in 1994 to over USD 384 billion in 2012 (SA Presidency, 2014). South Africa's economy emerged largely unscathed from the 2008-9 global recession and financial crisis due to rising commodity prices and high demand for the country's top exports, including gold, platinum, iron ore, and coal from emerging markets and other developing and middle-income economies (Kumo et al, 2014).

However, South Africa continues to be constrained by a number of structural weaknesses including high rates of unemployment, persistent skills shortages across a number of economic sectors, pervasive wealth inequalities, and large infrastructure gaps (such as the constrained energy grid). These structural challenges have limited both the economy's current performance and potential improvements.

Despite sustained economic growth from 2008-2012, the post-2008 recession period has presented additional challenges for South Africa's economy. Officially, unemployment currently stands at 25.2%, while the expanded rate of employment (which accounts for those individuals that are not actively seeking employment, but have been unemployed for some time) stands at a higher 35.6% nationally (Statistics SA, 2014b). Youth unemployment is especially pervasive, with over 50% of individuals aged 15-24 remaining unemployed (World Economic Forum, 2014). Income inequality remains at amongst the highest levels in the

world, and is increasingly amplified by the country's fundamental skills shortages (Liebbrandt et al, 2011; Statistics SA, 2014a).

The country also finds itself increasingly affected by global economic dynamics. Sustained austerity and poor economic growth in European countries (the EU is collectively the largest importer of South African goods), the reduction of the United States' quantitative easing schemes, and the gradual reorientation of China's foundational economic practices from investment-to-consumption have contributed to the swift depreciation of the South African rand, greater inflationary pressures, and a larger current account deficit (estimated at around 6% of GDP at the start of 2015) (SA Treasury, 2015: 23).

South Africa's mining industries, a significant driver of the country's overall economic performance, have also been affected by shifting global dynamics and trends. Increasingly volatile commodity prices and high costs in the labour sector contributed to the loss of over 20,000 jobs in the mining industry between 2012 and 2013 (SA History Online, 2014). The January-June 2014 labour strikes in the North West Province's platinum mines, the longest wage-related strike in the country's history, single-handedly erased 1.3% off the quarterly GDP projections while the striking miners lost 45% of their annual income (SA History Online, 2014).

## **7 Methodology of the Special Committee's Investigation**

The Special Committee on Social Cohesion employed a two-pronged approach to its investigation. The first component included the use of targeted workshops and interviews to collect qualitative data on the threats and challenges to, and opportunities for, social cohesion in KZN. The participants in these workshops came from various sectors and interest-based groupings across the province, and as far as possible, the Committee endeavoured to include participants from geographical areas outside the main metropolitan area of eThekweni.

The methodology applied intended on capturing the perceptions of the visible public of KZN. The visible public captures the views of opinion makers, activists, commentators – this is valuable for assessing social cohesion because these individuals shape opinions in society. The data collected throughout the investigation and the views expressed by those interviewed is framed as “perceptions”. The terminology of ‘perceptions’ was used in order to demonstrate that the data collected by Special Committee reflected purely the views expressed during the consultations without attaching any value or judgements.

The Committee extended invitations to a large number of participants across 14 social and economic sectors. These included:

- Academics and Educators
- Big Business Leaders
- Civil Society
- Disabled Persons
- Foreign Nationals and Refugees
- Labour
- Media
- Professional Consultants
- Religious Leaders
- Small Business Leaders
- Sports Representatives
- Women's Groups
- Youth Formations

While these groups are disaggregated here, it is important to note that as is the case with all people, attendees were representative of multiple identities. Participants may have been invited as representatives of one group, but often raised issues relevant to another group.

In order to reach those individuals or constituencies that could not be reached by the consultations, a wider submissions process was initiated. Adverts inviting submissions to the Special Committee were placed in two major newspapers: *The Mercury*, an English daily and *Isolezwe*, an IsiZulu daily, and ran for four consecutive Mondays in June and July, with a closing date of 15 July, 2014. A total of 11 written submissions were received in this way. Two representatives from organisations that did not attend the consultations were interviewed individually.

### 7.1 Data Collection

A set of five structured open-ended questions was posed to all participants in the workshops and interviews, and served as a catalyst for discussions. These questions were:

- Within the Province of KZN, where do you think the greatest source of tension and misunderstanding comes from? Can you list some examples?
- What do you think the key social divisions in the Province are? Have you, or anyone you know, experienced these?
- Which institutions do you think play a role in contributing toward social tensions? Which institutions do you think play a role in mitigating social tensions? What roles do they play?
- Under what circumstances are people most likely to resort to violence?
- What in your experience are methods or processes that have contributed to the reduction in social tensions?

Each of the consultation sessions was facilitated by at least one member of the Special Committee, and transcribed in note form by the Secretariat. The transcripts of the discussions were then loosely coded according to key themes in order to gauge the frequency with which certain issues arose. The presentation of data that follows is drawn from the focus groups, the written submissions and the interviews. The issues are presented in themes as they appear in the presentation and analysis of data.

### 7.2 Limitations of Methodology

From the onset, the Special Committee recognises the limitations of the methodology employed to conduct this investigation. Approximately 120 persons in total were engaged by

the entirety of the investigation, in both the consultations and the written submissions. Given the limited financial resources and time constraints, the majority of the individuals consulted resided in either the eThekweni or uMgungundlovu Municipality. Further, these constraints also informed the Special Committee's choice to conduct focus group consultations as opposed to community dialogues and large town-hall plenaries.



## 8 Presentation and Analysis of Data

A threat to social cohesion can be defined as any state or condition that inhibits or damages the progress toward a significantly higher level of equality and mutual acceptance. These threats could lie in the economic, political or social domains of communal existence. The analysis that follows is based on a model locating the nature of threats in three dimensions: manifestations of the threat, vulnerabilities of those affected by the threat, and consequences of the threat for social cohesion. The threats discussed below are described in terms of their functional attributes including the immediacy with which they present themselves, in order to assist the Provincial Government to determine the proximity of the threats. Our assessment of the threats is based on a model developed by Wilson (2007) and implemented in Trimintzios and Gavrilă (2013): the model is loosely adapted from a risk assessment model that examines the manifestations, the vulnerability of those affected and the consequences of the threats.

**A. *Manifestation of threat in KZN:*** This aspect of the model seeks to interrogate how each specific threat manifests itself in daily life throughout the Province. The importance of this criterion is that it enables the Special Committee to examine how specific threats impact upon different social, economic and political sectors of KZN as well as to tease out some of the underlying forces that drive the examined threats. The manifestations reflected here are drawn directly from the reflections of participants in the consultations, and from written submissions and interviews.


**B. *Vulnerability of Stakeholders to threat:*** This aspect of the model strives to identify and understand which segments of society in KZN are vulnerable to each specific threat, as well as to describe the ways in which these vulnerabilities manifest. Specifically, vulnerability will be assessed in the ways that each identified threat potentially contributes to the deterioration of more equal and tolerant relations within and between the identified stakeholder groups. In this light, the Special Committee will, for each threat, examine the extent to which various groupings in the province are vulnerable to specific threats to social cohesion:

- a. Provincial and local government structures;
- b. Private sector actors (including large businesses and professional associations, small and medium enterprises, and informal economic actors);

- c. Communities: (interest-based communities, social and cultural communities, and physical and spatial communities); and
- d. Individuals throughout the Province.

**C. Consequences of threat to communal relations:** This aspect of the model seeks to identify the consequences of each of the identified threats and how they have impacted upon community relations within the Province.


This model is represented in schematic form in Figure 1 below.



**Figure 1: Analytical model for assessing threats to social cohesion**

Threats to social cohesion as enumerated by participants in the following section were grouped together in ways that emphasise their similarity and were then analysed in accordance with the model described above. In assessing the nature of threats to social cohesion, it is important not only to examine the manifestations of the threats, but also their potential consequences and who will be vulnerable to these consequences, and in which ways.

The Threats charted in Figure 2 (below) are expanded upon in Annex 1.



**Figure 2: Chart of Threats to Social Cohesion**

### 8.1 Structural Threats

Structural threats arise from the way South African society has been organised as a result of history, government policies and legislation. These threats have socio-economic and spatial dimensions and also affect the life chances of individuals and groups.

### 8.1.1 Socio-economic Inequalities

The predominant theme that emerged from the discussions with various stakeholders of KZN was that socio-economic inequalities present the greatest threat to social cohesion in the Province. Socio-economic inequalities manifesting themselves as poverty, spatial legacies of apartheid, inequalities in access to education, unemployment, the rural-urban divide, and limited access to land and service delivery were pervasive throughout the discussions. The same inequalities surfaced in relation to a number of issues such as government procurement practices and spatial configuration of the Province, which will be explained further in the following sections. The following featured as what participants perceived to be manifestations, causes or aggravating factors of socio-economic inequalities.

Across all of the groups interviewed, references to socio-economic inequalities appeared most prominently. The issue of inequality was raised with reference to racial and economic stratification, the allocation of state resources, as well as differences in the quality and reliability of service delivery between wealthy areas and poorer areas. The overall view of the participants highlighted the lack of basic resources and the state of the health and transport systems. Participants also acknowledged that most of these inequalities have, however unintentionally, been exacerbated over the past twenty years by policies specifically meant to address them. A view emerged that “Government made a mistake somewhere [with] BBEE: who is supposed to qualify for these in terms of Indians, Blacks and Chinese? ...Distribution of resources by government is causing a threat to social cohesion”. Those who held this view perceived that B-BBEE had not succeeded because it had created a few elites and marginalised the majority.

Some specific issues raised included poverty and the distribution of economic resources and opportunities, such as government tenders. Some participants wondered why the poor do not have access to the same opportunities as the rich, especially the opportunities to benefit from tenders and to improve themselves. Participants stressed that they had seen some individuals benefit repeatedly from tenders. The view was “we do not need to build a few mega millionaires; we need a nation that is doing well. Government should be a catalyst that allows people to build bigger businesses in the private sector.” A number of participants pointed to the urgent need for a socio-economic indaba (or ‘CODESA’-type meeting). Such a meeting, they advocated, should host a broad cross-section of South African society to discuss socio-economic issues and the building of a socio-economic compact across the classes, in order to stem the worst effects of inequality in KZN society, and in South Africa more broadly.

### 8.1.2 Poverty

Participants asserted that poverty is one of the greatest issues facing South Africa. “[Government’s] first task should be to eradicate poverty and level the playing fields. Why don’t people get their houses? Why do some get and some don’t? There has to be a measure of determination from the authorities” were some of the most significant questions asked by participants. Poverty was mentioned in the context of small business and the challenge it poses to those who wish to establish business initiatives. Poverty was also referred to in the context of people’s frustrations about not being able to enter higher education or obtain employment. Poverty was perceived as promoting the sort of competition for scarce resources between local people and refugees that we have recently witnessed. By and large poverty was seen as the underlying condition that challenges social cohesion.

### 8.1.3 Spatial Legacies of Apartheid

The spatial legacy of apartheid in KZN was also perceived to be an underlying force that impedes social cohesion. This legacy is largely the consequence of the Bantustan programme of the apartheid era and is manifest in the prevalence of townships, peri-urban communities, shacks and transit camps today. It reveals stark inequalities in terms of access to basic housing, education, health services, utilities, and gainful employment opportunities. The urban-rural divide was perceived to have become even more pronounced during South Africa’s 20 years of democracy: urban metros have become more socio-economically integrated and prosperous, while rural areas lack basic infrastructure and development. These inequalities further fuel perceptions within the communities of an ‘us versus them’ mentality, and present grave implications for the psychological wellbeing and material wealth of people in rural areas without the same access to skills, opportunities, and capital. This also fuels tensions based on the idea that an individual does not ‘really belong’ in an area, whether a person from eThekweni goes to Zululand, or vice versa. For example, one view emerged that “there is a feeling, that pure Zulus are in the north and the ones in the south are somewhat contaminated.” In another common expression of ‘regionalism’, it was stated that shop stewards from outside eThekweni Municipality are not necessarily taken as seriously as those from Durban.

Another manifestation of these spatial inequalities can be found across KZN's transportation system and infrastructure. Those individuals who can afford private transport may experience a significantly higher quality of life than those who rely on public transport. Private transport allows for greater freedom of movement and expression. Those who live in rural areas, townships, peri-urban and informal settlements are far less likely to have their own transport, thus adding another significant dimension to the inequalities experienced.

#### 8.1.4 Land, Services and the Rural-urban Divide

Participants, such as those from the labour sector, were of the view that land reform is not being effectively managed. The so-called cooperatives are not effective, while the former Transkei system of sharecropping worked quite well. A written submission suggested an economic plan for the uThungulu District. The writer, a long-term resident of the area, suggested the expansion of the sugar cane agricultural sector, which would produce 2 million extra tons of sugar cane, valued at some R900 million, according to his estimates. This, he said, would develop large under-utilised areas, and stimulate community development faster than the cultivation of any other crop. Another written submission cautioned that a very high percentage of land claims affecting forestry land that were lodged 16 years ago remain unresolved, leading to high levels of frustration in the area in question. This, the author suggested, has led to arson and other attacks on commercial forestry in the area that if left unaddressed could prove catastrophic.

Participants from a number of the consultations pointed out that there seem to be differences in service delivery between wealthier and poorer areas are of great concern. For instance, "In affluent areas like Umhlanga and Ballito, you will find that there are no issues of shortage of water and electricity but in areas adjacent to these like KwaMashu, you will find such issues. This reinforced the participants' perceptions of the different nature of infrastructure in these areas." Similarly, "In Umlazi... whether people can afford to pay or not, a week will go by without them having water or electricity. Infrastructure in the poor communities and those living an opulent life is not of the same quality." Likewise, participants asserted that enhanced service delivery in the rural areas also needs to be prioritised. The rural areas should be places where people can work closer to where they live. "Urban life has encouraged laziness, where the generation of livelihoods has no meaning", according to participants. "There is a misperception in our society: our children believe that life is in

Durban”, one participant asserted, stating that this is especially true in the Black community. He recommended that development of people needs to start from a local level, and that the government must provide supporting mechanisms to encourage people to live in rural areas.

Spatial legacies of apartheid manifest in the inequitable use of residential space and the historical settlement of Black, Indian and Coloured communities far from commercial centres. It should be noted, however, that in terms of the layout of residential areas, divisions that were historically based upon race are now perceived to be based on class to a greater extent. This continues to have an impact on social cohesion today. The consultation with representatives from the sporting community noted, for example, that the lack of available transportation for certain sporting codes poses a real challenge to the team as they require daily practices at facilities (including those associated with beaches) located far from townships.

#### 8.1.5 Education

Inequitable access to quality education was perceived by participants to be the root cause of the identified socio-economic threats. Participants repeatedly cited the poor distribution of educational resources and unequal access to quality education and directly linked these to socio-economic inequalities throughout the Province. “If government is to invest in education,” according to their view, “that is one key area where things might start going right.” A number of participants, across virtually all the sectors interviewed, asserted that quality education is the foundation upon which individuals can build their futures, and therefore systemic inequalities in education constitute inhibitors for youth in realising their full potential. More specifically, participants emphasized the poor quality of education that a majority of citizens in KZN received. The divisions between those who have sufficient access and those who do not is predicated along the historical lines of marginalization during the apartheid era, namely race, socio-economic status, and geographic location.

Participants stated that significant educational inequalities include the quality of instruction and availability of resources in schools. Although access to quality schools is no longer predicated upon race, access is now broadly decided along socio-economic lines: those families with greater wealth, and especially those who live in urban areas, are more likely to have access to better quality schooling for their children. Indeed, some participants likened the current situation in which poor education relegates one to a life of limited employment

opportunities to slavery. They stated further that if our society can agree that education will heal the scars of the past, then we should have education as a priority to ensure that no child will be in the position of saying they cannot attend tertiary education institutions due to cost. A view emerged that “we are equal today; both Black and White people must run from here to town but the Black man has one leg and this race is not fair, has never been and continues not to be.”

A number of students do not have access to high quality mathematics, English and science instruction, as well as extra-curricular support in these subjects. These subjects are considered foundational for the cultivation of skills for young adults to successfully transition into the formal economy. Yet, it is precisely these subjects that South African students struggle with most (World Economic Forum, 2014). These specific challenges were identified by participants: that English is the predominant language of instruction for mathematics and the sciences; that many families do not have the necessary financial or time resources to support their children in receiving extra-curricular academic support; and that the Maths Literacy subject does not teach the appropriate skills demanded by KZN’s labour market.

Learners coming from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds do not have the same material resources to pay school fees, purchase textbooks and school clothing, and afford extra-curricular academic support. As many learners from the Province come from disadvantaged backgrounds, these discrepancies further reinforce achievement gaps between students, largely along the Province’s historical divides. Finally, concerns were raised about the relevance and efficacy of the Maths Literacy subject in preparing learners for the labour market. Despite the subject’s design as a more practical, accessible, and skills-driven curriculum (especially within the context of the abovementioned language challenges related to core maths), many felt that it nonetheless restricts learners’ potential for developing the necessary skills for jobs that require mathematical skills.

Given these challenges, some learners are systematically disadvantaged and are consequently less able to process the detailed curricula of technical and professional schools despite the intention of these schools to be more accessible to learners than institutions of higher education. It remains important to note that participants did caution that for many fields, especially in the artisan and engineering disciplines, professional experience was as important as education for developing a productive career in the field. However, this directly alludes to another significant challenge in developing a sustainable body of professionals, namely that



there remain high barriers for aspiring individuals to attain the necessary work experience to complement their burgeoning professional careers.

According to one written submission, “The schools have to be in the forefront of leading this change [in society]. Teachers need to be integrated racially in all public schools and a new culture must be built, based on hearing and sharing our stories and a vision of a country and society we want to create and build together.” One positive outcome of many from ensuring equitable educational opportunities will be the cultivation of a citizenry that is not dependent on social grants, according to participants.

#### 8.1.6 Unemployment

Education and employment are closely linked factors. High levels of unemployment throughout the Province constitute another important issue raised across the consultations. Participants cited that there are many reasons why some individuals are more likely than others to attain meaningful employment throughout the Province, such as higher levels of skills (due to greater access to education and greater levels of professional experience), to more challenging reasons such as political connections and nepotism. There remained a distinct sense that gainful employment was only available to a few individuals and not to the majority. These inequalities were identified as creating distinctly different experiences of citizenship within KZN between those who can comfortably provide for themselves and their families, and those who cannot; these stark differences in lifestyles ultimately divide the population at large and inhibit social cohesion. One participant stated, “If you cannot provide for your family, then you will not be at peace with yourself...and how can you be at peace with others if you are not at peace with yourself?”

#### 8.1.7 Discussion

Structural threats to social cohesion are rooted in South Africa’s historical political economy. The colonial and Apartheid systems, as examined in the literature, were founded upon principles of economic exploitation and racial discrimination, resulting in widespread poverty and unemployment, as well as profound socio-economic inequalities. These structural legacies persist in today’s economy. The socio-economic threats are stand-alone challenges and also consist of interrelated and complex dimensions, and their persistence is tied to the

country's broader macro-economic performance on the continent and in the world. The threats mentioned by participants in the groups have empirical salience.

KZN has one of the highest provincial poverty rates in South Africa as over 26% of the country's impoverished population live in this province, translating to 56,3% of KZN inhabitants living in poverty (Stats SA, 2014c: 31). These 2011 statistics place KZN as the Province with the third highest level of poverty in the country, with Limpopo and the Eastern Cape having the highest levels of poverty (Stats SA, 2014c: 31).

In his January 2014 State of the Province Address, Premier Mchunu declared poverty "public enemy number one", and reminded observers of the implementation of OSS, launched in 2011. According to statistics, about a third (32%) of the residents of eThekweni live in poverty, compared to 25% in Johannesburg (eThekweni Municipality 2013: 13). The current annual personal income per capita for the municipality is R51 747, compared to R61 491 for Johannesburg and R61 535 for Cape Town (SAIRR, 2013: 121).

It is also important to recognise that the uneven distribution of the population also underlie these statistics – given that KZN also has the second largest population of the country's nine provinces. The increased incidences of poverty relative to other provinces is also aggravated by its larger population. In 2015, StatsSA identified that approximately 27 million South Africans live below the poverty line, surviving on R779 per month or less, an absolute number that has declined since 2012 (Payet, 2015).

In 2014, the World Bank determined that amongst similarly comparable countries, South Africa had a lower poverty headcount than Indonesia (according to market income minus taxes) and similar levels to Guatemala and Armenia; the study also concluded that South Africa's policies of improving direct transfers to citizens, especially through social grants, reduced poverty and inequality at higher rates than similar interventions in Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay (World Bank 2014).

According to Stats SA, in 2011, KZN's largest contributions to national GDP came from the finance, real estate and business services sectors (16,5%), manufacturing (15,8%), and wholesale, retail and motor trade, along with catering and accommodation (15,5%). All but the last of these sectors requires a skilled workforce, which in turn depends upon a good general standard of basic education.

Unemployment is one of the greatest threats to social cohesion in South Africa today. There are stark inequalities in the availability of and access to employment throughout the Province. Participants in the consultations listed unemployment as one of the key factors creating the enormous gap between the wealthy and the poor. This was also seen as an important component of interpersonal relationships. A number of participants associated social tensions with unemployment and poverty. One participant wondered whether any form of social cohesion could be achieved in the context of high unemployment.

Another significant statistic is the over 4 million unemployed and non-economically active persons in the Province aged between 15 and 64. In comparison with the national data, KZN confronts higher unemployment rates, lower labour force participation rate, and lower absorption rates, highlighting the urgent challenges pertaining to employment in the Province.

	<b>Populati on (Age 15-64)</b>	<b>Labou r Force</b>	<b>Employ ed</b>	<b>Unemplo yed</b>	<b>Not Economi cally Active<sup>5</sup></b>	<b>Unemploy ment Rate</b>	<b>Labour Force Participati on Rate<sup>6</sup></b>	<b>Employed/P opulation Ratio (Absorption Rate)</b>
<b>KZN</b>	6,643	4,058	2,520	1,539	2,585	37,9%	61,1%	37,9%
<b>RSA</b>	35,643	23,416	15,320	8,096	12,227	34,6%	65,7%	43,0%

**Table 2: Labour Force Characteristics in KZN and comparison with South Africa (Q4, 2014)**

*NB: Units are in thousands, and definition used is the expanded definition of unemployment*

Source: Statistics South Africa, 2014 (Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Q4, 2014 (P.19-20)

Both the World Bank and the International Labour Organisation highlight South Africa's high levels of unemployment as reflective of long-term structural challenges, which rank

<sup>5</sup> Persons aged 15-64 years who are neither employed nor unemployed during the sampling period (Statistics South Africa, 2014: xxiv).

<sup>6</sup> Defined as the ratio of the labour force to the working age population, expressed in percentages. It is a measure of the extent of an economy's working-age population that is economically active (OECD Glossary).

amongst the highest in the world (International Labour Organisation, 2014; World Bank, 2014).

National, provincial and local government face particular challenges as a direct result of widespread unemployment. Persistent unemployment impacts upon individuals' social, economic, cultural, and psychological wellbeing. Long-term unemployment impacts upon the health of individuals and communities at large, and this challenge is particularly relevant in a context where a large proportion of the unemployed are youth. With many of the Province's youth population facing persistent unemployment, they remain especially vulnerable to long-term social and economic challenges, and are more vulnerable to engaging in violent protests, crime and substance abuse, as well as criminality. Government also faces vulnerability connected to perceptions of its effectiveness. The government may elect to make greater shares of government revenue available for social security, which impacts upon the sustainability of such social security safety nets, and indeed upon all of government's funding for other projects. Communities are vulnerable to the various psychosocial effects of chronic unemployment. These are characterised, amongst others by hopelessness and idleness. One of the legacies of apartheid is that businesses are also situated far from where many of the unemployed live, so there are added challenges to finding employment. As shown by academic accounts, unemployment also has a negative impact on household formation (Klasen and Woolard, 2009). Unemployment delays the establishment of households by the young, sometimes for decades, and also places greater pressure on those who receive social security, such as old-age pensioners. This is an enormous strain on many families.

Unemployed persons run the risk of feeling marginalized from society and even within their own families. This could have severe mental health outcomes, affecting the broader cohesion of the family, as the primary socializing unit and source of social support or insurance. The unemployed should be disaggregated into those who have never worked, and those who have become recently unemployed, and those who have stopped searching for employment. These are quite different constituencies with different levels of social and economic standing investment in society. Those who have recently become unemployed may yet harbour hopes of becoming employed again before too long, while those who have long been unemployed form part of the statistics of those who have given up looking for suitable employment. While the former may still own property and assets, the latter may not, potentially leading to a sense of alienation from society.

In the field of education, according to the KZN Department of Education's 2013 Annual Report, in spite of KZN being the second-most populous province after Gauteng, it is the province that provides access to teaching and learning to more learners than any other, "contributing 22% of learners, teachers, targets and outputs to the national education system (KZN Department of Education, 2014: 21). The majority of learners, it is conceded, are considered to be living in poverty, especially in areas where quality education is not easily accessible. The Department has adopted a strategy to provide transport to those learners who have to travel long distances to school; there is also a National School Nutrition Programme in the poorest schools (KZN Provincial Government, 2015:42-46). In recent years, the Province has seen an increase in learners who pass their matric exams: in 2009, the Provincial pass-rate was 61.1 percent, which rose to 77.4 percent in 2013 (KZN Provincial Government, 2015: 47). According to its Annual Report (2014) "The Department continues to offer Co-curricular activities that range from choral music, cultural activities, indigenous games and sporting activities in order to promote national identity and social cohesion" (KZN Department of Education, 2014: 22). The provincial learner-educator ratio in public ordinary schools is approximately 29:1. Yet, this figure masks wide differences between poor schools and wealthier schools, where, through the employment of additional teaching staff, school governing bodies are able to keep learner: educator ratios low.

A central challenge of inequitable access to quality education is that although skilled employment has grown as a proportion of total employment since 1994, uneven and marginal gains in skills development, especially within the Black African community, remains a significant contributor to high levels of poverty, unemployment, and socio-economic inequalities (Statistics SA, 2014a). It is thus clear that inequitable access to quality education is both a cause and a consequence of varying access to skills, capital and opportunity, a point that is reaffirmed by Statistics South Africa in its comprehensive analysis of poverty trends in South Africa (Statistics SA, 2014c: 30).

Another analysis conducted by the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ) highlights, through using data collected between 2007-2010, that South Africa's average reading and student mathematics scores were better than those in countries such as Uganda, Mozambique, Lesotho, Zambia, Malawi, and other countries in the African Sahel and Central Africa (SACMEQ, 2011; Wilkinson, 2013). On the contrary, the 2011 TIMSS report maintains that South African learners have the second lowest performance in mathematics and science amongst the 42 middle-income countries that

participated in its most recent study (TIMSS, 2011: 46). The 2015-2016 World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report similarly found that the quality of South Africa's education system ranked amongst the lowest in the world (WEF, 2015: 327).

Examples of the legacy of apartheid's spatial divide highlighted how spatially marginalised areas such as townships and informal settlements cannot adapt to the specific and specialised needs of the communities they serve, such as the infrastructure adaptations needed by physically disabled individuals. The representatives of disabled people's organisations also noted how the disabled still face challenges with public transport, for example. There are efforts underway to improve this, however. An example is the Bridge City shopping and residential centre development in KwaMashu, eThekweni. This development is a public-private partnership between the eThekweni Municipality and Tongaat Hulett's, and is envisaged to be a key node in the future rapid public transport network (Cokayne, 2013, online).

## 8.2 Institutional Threats

Institutional threats arise from the way institutions including government institutions, families, schools, and other agents of socialisation operate. These include government procurement practices and B-BBEE, corruption, and government communications with citizens.

### 8.2.1 Government Procurement Practices and Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment

Government procurement practices and B-BBEE elicited a major critique amongst the participants, and probably are at the centre of observed social disharmony. This was particularly apparent from the groups involving media, civil society, small business, and professional consultants. The issues, as expressed by participants, were as followed:

- Perceptions of financial dominance in the procurement process by certain groupings;
- The structuring of the tender process;
- The meaning of 'capacitation and skills development'; and,
- Perceived Corruption in the Tendering process.

#### 8.2.1.1 Perceptions of Financial Dominance by certain groupings

Participants believed that the distribution of tenders favoured certain groups, particularly members of the Indian community, disproportionately. Participants believed that it is easy for members of the Indian community to access employment and business opportunities from the government. Such things, they argued, if not addressed, may further threaten social cohesion.

Some participants during the consultations expressed their views that the issue of resource allocation, and the businesses that are patronised or supported by the state, constitute major sources of tension in the Province. They intimated that whether one looks at large or small businesses, one would find that resource allocation has a racial character.

For instance, allegations were made that Indian-owned hardware shops located at the entry to African townships constituted a monopoly of suppliers of building material prescribed for school construction, and that when African contractors won bids they were compelled to procure material from these Indian-owned cartels. Even if not true, these are widely-held and potentially destructive perceptions.

One group proposed that Indian residents of KZN be excluded from categories that benefit from B-BBEE, as for example, Indians constitute 11% of those who are economically active, but hold more than 22% of management positions in the Province<sup>7</sup>.

Others countered that these observations should be cautioned not to see tenders as driven by race - because there are simply those individuals, regardless of race, who are 'in' and those who are 'out'. Others observed further that workers' rights were not explicitly protected throughout the duration of government tender processes.

A suggestion was made that broader racialised critiques of procurement challenges should be contextualized by the conditions perpetuating a generally inhospitable environment for small businesses in the Province. Small businesses, it was claimed, face a triple challenge of worsening poverty, and diminishing resources for investment in entrepreneurship; unfair competition from bigger, more established businesses; and low levels of entrepreneurship.

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<sup>7</sup> This is an uncorrected figure as stated by the participant. Indian South Africans in fact hold 17,4% of management positions in the Province, according to the 2013-14 Employment Equity Report. Indian South Africans comprise some 17,1% of the Economically Active Population of KZN Province (Commission for Employment Equity, 2014: 23).

### 8.2.1.2 The Structuring of the Tendering Process

Throughout these sessions, participants expressed reservations about the structure of the government's procurement practices. By illustration, one chartered accountant explained that the government procurement system is weighted 90:10<sup>8</sup> for price functionality against BEE for tenders over R1 million, and 80:20 for all tenders under R1 million. This system, he argued, does not take into account the historical challenges faced by the Black service provider, who is unable to compete on these grounds, while other companies may have access to subsidized pricing from parent companies in home countries, or from established networks of supply with cheap producers in China or India.

Participants also highlighted what they considered to be skewed barriers for entry for Black-owned SMMEs when it comes to B-BBEE. The manner in which the requirements have been structured, they argued, requires a company to have a turnover of above R5 million per year – a criterion that very few, if any, Black companies meet. “Most of the problems suffocating us as Black business,” offered a participant, “are coming from national level.” By this was meant the national legal framework for small businesses and B-BBEE.

One prominent representative from a professional association shared his experience in both a written submission and in the consultation. He considered that the government's willingness to enlist the services of Black lawyers, for example, is low. Specifically, he highlighted entry requirements for certain bids and tenders as unlikely to be met by Black lawyers. A further challenge is represented by the difficulty some Black lawyers face in obtaining funding from private financial institutions when starting their own practices. Black lawyers also perceive a lack of confidence in their skills by public sector and state-owned companies.

An interviewee perceived that there are two challenges with the weights allocated to BEE in the government procurement process, namely:

- The weight allocated is too small to achieve the objective: if a Black service provider has already lost out on price and functionality, the remaining 10% or 20% for BEE will not strengthen his or her case in any significant way.
- The scoring of 10% or 20% no longer applies only to the more stringent criterion of ownership of companies the government does business with, but now extends to management, training and development, procurement, and corporate social

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<sup>8</sup> See the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 2000 (Act No.5 of 2000).



responsibility. For instance, Company X is a level 2 Contributor, and so is Company Y. Company X is 100% Black, whereas Company Y is 100% White. However, Company Y has enhanced its BEE credentials with management, training and corporate social responsibility, rather than ownership.

#### 8.2.1.3 The meaning of 'capacitation and skills development';

On issues concerning skills development, a consultant felt that the requirement for Black firms to be encouraged to form joint ventures with White counterparts in order to facilitate skills transfer was counterproductive. This does not always result in skills transfer, as expressed by the interviewee, because the lead consultant (usually the White company responsible for skills transfer) establishes and maintains relationships with the client; invoicing is done by the lead consultant (who pays the BEE partner at his or her whim), and the plan and execution of the project is determined and directed by the lead consultant.

The extension and cultivation of relationships then continues to have positive spin-offs for lead consultants, as he argued, they then benefit from establishing informal relations with clients. This was referred to as the "there-is-something-coming syndrome", "where the big firm has breakfast or dinner with a government (would-be client) official who briefs this firm on what the government or municipal department wants. The big firm then goes to prepare the concept and specifications. The task is then advertised as an emergency with ridiculous time frames where only the briefed firm has had ample time to prepare for submission."

A chartered accountant who was interviewed suggested that there are two areas of the Black economic empowerment policy tool that he perceived as limiting the growth and uptake of Black service providers: the issues of capacity development and skills transfer. According to this individual, "There is a strange phenomenon camouflaged as 'capacity' where Africans are advised to come in groups or consortia – they are thus given tenders as a single unit, called a 'group beneficiary', whereas large established firms count as units each, meanwhile the Black consortium counts as a single unit. It might comprise seven or ten individuals or even more, it still counts as one unit – that is empowerment for you – through a swearword called 'capacity'."

#### 8.2.1.4 Perceived Corruption in the Tendering Process

Some participants also expressed reservations regarding the repeated awarding of tenders to the same individuals. They proposed that those awarded tenders be required to support the businesses of smaller entrepreneurs. A Black chartered accountant related similar concerns, stating his perspective, “If we accept apartheid to be the cause, then the system that has succeeded apartheid has not addressed them – instead we have a system that through corruption accelerated what apartheid did.”

Participants called for government to create more opportunities for Black professionals to flourish, especially in the accounting and law professions. They also called for far greater transparency and accountability from government. They suggested that twinning programmes be introduced to the professional sectors, in which larger firms are linked with smaller firms owned by previously disadvantaged persons, in a manner that is constructive to both parties. Government should also ensure that developing firms and businesses have access to well-managed start-up finance.

#### 8.2.2 Corruption

Dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in positions of authority in the public and private sectors, often involving bribery, was identified as a factor causing tension in the Province. Participants believed that corruption exacerbates the poor distribution of resources, especially when people who are suspected of corruption are repeatedly awarded tenders. Not only are people being given an unfair opportunity for enrichment from government funds, but this form of corruption often also results in poor delivery of services. Some participants were of the view that corruption in the private sector is actually more widespread than in the public sector and that this is where the attention of the public should be focused. Another view was that corruption is so common and widespread that it affects everybody and as a result even good people can be compromised. The simple act of taking home a pen from work for one’s children is not seen as corruption by many people, but it was perceived that this is how the ‘slide’ begins. In the SMME space in particular, corruption was identified as one of the key issues that needs to be addressed.

### 8.2.3 Government's relations with citizens

Issues raised in this context related to political factors such as state legitimacy and representativeness, the political history of the Province, as well as government's communication and consultation strategies with citizens, and the manner in which it exercises its leadership including biases towards certain groups. "The government is supposed to represent everybody, but it does not. It is, in fact, one of the most dividing factors, as it operates a 'divide and rule' approach."

Youth participants highlighted their views that the limited successes of government's efforts to engage youth organisations consistently and constructively, restricts the fruitfulness of policies that are specifically intended to benefit youth. Representatives of the sports sector, who indicated that there is not enough meaningful dialogue between government officials and the communities, and local sports and community leaders, similarly echoed this sentiment. Sports sector participants noted that there remain significant divides between the political and bureaucratic administrators within the Department of Sports and Recreation and those leading the respective sports organisations and unions. A specific perception emerged that the top administrators of the Department do not have a keen understanding of the issues on the ground. Participants expressed concerns that the government and non-government entities responsible for developing sports within local communities have limited and narrow mandates, for example, the establishment of sports organisations, the building of structures and facilities, and the distribution of funds. In this light, the participants urged these entities to broaden their mandates to sharpen their efforts at 'balancing the playing field' – namely, ensuring that there are more efforts to sustainably develop sporting codes at the community levels and promoting more equitable access to financial resources across all sporting codes. Representatives of faith-based organisations expressed similar views, as they related to issues in the faith-based communities.

Participants in the consultations cited their experiences of compromised government relations with citizens, in a number of contexts, as threats to social cohesion. These included: slow responses; poor communication and dialogue, especially in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public policy initiatives; various negative perceptions of government, including that it is not acceptable to have a contrary view to the dominant political and policy programmes of the moment; that there is no common goal to which we all are working to achieve a better society, and that what is important to the people is not important to

government. The lack of coherent action between different government departments was also cited as one of the factors weakening social cohesion.

The unresolved tensions of the Province's political history were identified in a number of the stakeholder engagements as one of the major underlying threats to social cohesion in the Province. A view emerged that KZN is still grappling with significant issues of political intolerance, questions around regime performance, and diminished civic pride. After the recent elections, concerns were also expressed about incidents of political intimidation, with the two main sources of intimidation cited as being family and friends, and political parties.

Participants pointed out that many of the inherited imbalances and divisions have not been addressed, as evidenced by the continued prevalence of politically motivated killings each year. In this light, political alignment continues to be a key source of tension in the Province: according to some participants, there seems to be a great deal of benefit to be derived from aligning oneself to the 'right' political camps. Non-government organisations (NGOs) that do community work have also found that their acceptance is based on where their political allegiances are perceived to lie. Participants emphasized that it is not ideology as much as political alignment that determines or limits one's opportunities.

There is also an enormous amount of psychosocial trauma resulting from the political violence in the Province before and during South Africa's transition in the 1990s, which remains unaddressed. These levels of violence – particularly between Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the United Democratic Front (UDF)/ANC in the 1990s – were arguably the highest in South Africa, and their legacy was seen by some participants as a continuing threat to social cohesion in the Province today. Communities and individuals have not had enough opportunities to express their feelings about various forms of violence they have experienced. This may have lasting negative effects on society.

Participants called for a provincial audit across all departments of everything positive and negative that has occurred since 1994, similar to the Presidency's Twenty-Year Review, but perhaps more critical and inclusive in terms of process, inviting the participation of a wide range of stakeholders. They also suggested that language immersion programmes be initiated for government officials and civil servants. These should be region-specific, and should apply to officials who engage with the public, as well as senior officials.

Finally, youth participants asserted that negative perceptions have greatly affected their engagements with government institutions. For instance, perceptions emerged of government biases towards certain race and class groups, thereby youth to disengage from government processes and consultations and cultural celebrations of national days. The biases include the feelings that a number of young White South Africans view the government as being only for Black South Africans, limiting the space for critical interaction and engagement. Another example of negative perceptions concerning government's civic engagements relates to how individuals perceive social welfare grants. Participants maintained that the government has facilitated a "dependency syndrome" where members of the public exclusively rely on welfare support instead of taking their futures into their own hands. This perception then breeds resentment against those individuals who are perceived to be benefitting from this "dependency syndrome" as well as against the government, despite the positive and constructive intention of the welfare policies. Negative perceptions of the government, although perfectly acceptable in their own right, close the space for meaningful dialogue and collaboration to improve the policies for all. A key factor in the matrix of social cohesion, and a significant instrument in the dismantling of misperception, is the educational foundation of the youth of the province.

#### 8.2.4 Challenges of school-driven socialisation processes

Participants also noted the challenges emanating from schools that detract from their roles as constructive and positive agents of socialisation. They highlighted that many children today have differential access to primary and secondary schools, largely along class and race-driven lines. This differential access emanates from the sustained legacies of colonialism and apartheid, where education was used as a divisive socio-economic tool. As a result of these sustained legacies, children are exposed to functionally-driven differences within schools, which unintentionally inhibits exposure to different communities and people (e.g. the other) and reinforces negative perceptions and stereotypes.

#### 8.2.5 Breakdown of family and community structures as socialising agents

Participants also highlighted the breakdown of the family and community units as institutional threats to social cohesion. Participants observed that the tradition of strong family and community, which had been prominent over many decades, served as prominent societal institutions for promoting greater cohesion and understanding within a community.

However, participants in recent years have observed increases in detrimental behaviour within families (such as physical or substance abuse) and also noted increases of households with unemployed parents, single parent households and child-led households - the participants therefore expressed concerns that these challenges negatively impact upon children and communities over many years and detracted from . Participants highlighted that in many cases, children are impacted by negative social behaviours (such as idleness, physical abuse or a guardian's substance abuse) and that these behaviours become rooted within the affected family or community. Participants highlighted that communities often struggled to comprehensively address these challenges in unified and comprehensive manners, and that the negative social consequences have lasting and negative impacts on many people.

#### 8.2.6 Discussion

The Provincial Government is alive to the various institutional challenges threatening to inhibit greater social cohesion in the Province. In its 2014/5 *Back to Basics* assessment of the province, the KZN Provincial Government created an evaluation instrument to assess the performance of its local municipalities. that of the 61 municipalities surveyed, 41 were identified as functional, 15 were categorised as challenged and 5 identified to require intervention: between 2013/4 and 2014/5, nine municipalities moved into the category of functional, while three municipalities moved from requiring 'intervention' to 'challenged' (KZN Provincial Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2015: 46).

Of the total challenges identified in the Analysis of the Province's Support Plan progress per Institutional Pillar across all 61 municipalities, challenges related to Building Institution and Administrative Capacities (Pillar 5) and Sound Financial Management (Pillar 4) and held the second and third most challenges amongst the five identified pillars (KZN Provincial Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs: 55). For challenges under Pillar 5, the Province noted that of the 104 identified challenges identified between 2013/4 and 2014/5, 47 had already been resolved, 55 were in progress of being resolved, and only 2 had not achieved any progress in resolution; for Pillar 4, the Province noted that of the 96 identified challenges, 59 challenges had already been resolved, 36 were currently in progress

of being resolved, and only one had not made any progress towards resolution. (KZN Provincial Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2015: 55).

The optimal functioning of a democracy is predicated upon a relationship of trust between government and the governed. Because social cohesion comprises both horizontal relations – those between citizens - and vertical relations - those between citizens and their institutions - the health of politico-civic relations is a key aspect of the cohesiveness of any society. Recent statistics from the South African Reconciliation Barometer indicate that South Africans possess varied levels of confidence in political and government institutions. The figures were lowest for local government (48, 6%), the South African Police Services (47, 9%), and political parties (46, 2%) (IJR, 2014: 19) as reflected on Table 3 below.

<b>Institution</b>	<b>Figure</b>
Religious Institutions	67.0%
Public Protector	64.4%
Constitutional Court	59.3%
Legal System	57.4%
Presidency	55.1%
National Government	54.6%
Parliament	54.5%
Provincial Government	51.8%
Local government	48.6%
South African Police Services (SAPS)	47.9%
Political Parties	46.2%

**Table 3: Confidence in Institutions (IJR, 2014: 19)**

One important observation to draw from the above table is that those institutions that interact with citizens most frequently, e.g. political parties, the police, and local government elicit the lowest levels of confidence from the respondents surveyed. These relatively low levels of confidence can be traced back to fundamental issues of poor service delivery and instances of corruption in KZN’s municipal government structures, as well as the increasingly

confrontational incidents between police and local communities. Participants emphasised the importance of leadership that is “serious about engaging with communities”. In terms of the visible responses by leadership, participants stated that communities might respond more positively to the initiative of public officials modelling and advancing the peaceful resolution of conflict, rather than through public order, and potentially violent means. People should be rewarded for making their petitions in a delegation, rather than for burning down a library, they asserted: “People doubt the effectiveness of the democratic process”. This doubt builds distance between people and government, eroding government’s political capital and the willingness of people to participate in government-initiated activities and projects in the future. This may also result in citizens using other means, sometimes violent, to express themselves.

Another aspect of this relationship is the perception that only those who are ‘in’ can have access to government. Participants said: “We see that people who are politically connected get tenders”. This could lead to corruption, as individuals would then seek out government officials that they may attempt to bribe for economic opportunities, as long as an understanding prevails that this is acceptable behaviour and if it appears to be the only way to make economic progress. A Provincial task force, whose specific mandate is to interrogate the pattern of tender distribution in KZN over recent years, is currently investigating these claims further.

The KZN Provincial Government has placed, in recent months, greater emphasis on addressing some of the identified challenges in the procurement sector. This emphasis has been exemplified best by the recently convened Procurement Indaba, held in Durban from 13-14th August 2015. The Indaba was attended by delegates from all sectors of KZN society in order to identify the key challenges in the sector and to promote greater and more equitable socio-economic transformation. Amongst the various issues on the agenda at the Indaba, some of the more prominent concerned:

- “The possibility for the localisation and ring-fencing of certain economic sectors to achieve real economic transformation in KZN;
- draw conclusions on the obstacles to meaningful and sustainable participation of black people (especially Africans) on procurement opportunities by government and the private sector;



- the possibility of linking procurement to government strategy for revitalisation of the township economy;
- And, the possibility of an integral procurement system that would link government opportunities with the target group.” (KZN Provincial Department of Economic Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs 2015: 2)

The Indaba covered broad areas focusing on enterprise and supplier development to enable access to procurement opportunities, policy proposals to radically transform the public procurement and the role of financial institutions in fostering transformation in the province. The Indaba passed a number of resolutions, which included that procurement must be placed at the centre stage for radical economic transformation, that government must adopt a Set Aside and Strategic Targets Policy that are in line with the indaba’s resolution and that the government must ensure all suppliers doing business with the state mirror the demographics of the province. (KZN Provincial Department of Economic Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs 2015: 9)

### 8.3 Societal Threats

Societal threats emanate from the inherent and learned habits of daily life among communities and individuals in KZN. Such habits carry with them perceptions with negative stigmas and biases in various forms, language as a vehicle of construction and expression, as well as gender and power relations as vehicles of resource manipulation. Also, shared values form part of learned structures that ultimately shape social relations in communities and groupings.

#### 8.3.1 Racial stereotyping

Race remains a significant issue pervading many of the debates on social cohesion. Negative perceptions held of individuals from one race group by individuals of another permeate KZN. Examples were cited of how youth of different race groups immediately generalize, and often stereotype, individuals according to their skin colour and race group. These stereotypes are then further enhanced when individuals perceive race to serve as a source of preferential treatment and access. A written submission elaborated that “tribalism, racialism and Afro-phobia” are seen as threats to social cohesion. These phenomena entrench individuals’

feelings of superiority over others, which then emerge as sources of tension and also contribute to ‘silo’ mentalities of isolation within and between groups. For example, a White South African with an Afrikaner surname may immediately be identified and perceived as White, Afrikaner, or as European, regardless of the actual identity that the individual constructs for him- or herself. Participants also noted the prevalence of negative race-driven perceptions unintentionally replicated through government policies. Although government policies are founded on a non-racial legislative platform, certain policies were designed explicitly to codify racial identities such as is the case in economic empowerment policies. These tensions were amplified, according to participants, in the feeling that race and political allegiance are strongly affiliated and thus impacted upon how individuals were perceived and treated. An example of this includes perceptions about which job opportunities are available to youth, especially to those who understood employment opportunities to be exclusively limited to individuals of a specific race. Participants questioned why it is still necessary to classify persons according to race on certain government forms.

### 8.3.2 Perceptions, Stigma and Biases

A number of participants attributed challenges to social cohesion to negative perceptions and misperceptions that arise from prejudices passed from parents to children. Perceptions took the following forms, each seen as the source of differentials in access to and the allocation of resources:

### 8.3.3 Marginalisation:

Marginalisation is rooted in pervasive feelings of inequity, rejection, and isolation, which in turn fuel mistrust and hatred of others and manifests in a few prominent forms such as the rural urban divide, the racial and cultural divide, the generational divide, the stigma attached to HIV/AIDS and misperceptions about the disabled.

### 8.3.4 The rural-urban divide

Participants identified the marginalisation of KZN’s rural communities as among the most divisive forms of marginalisation. They argued that given the relative dearth of basic social services, infrastructure development, and employment opportunities in the rural areas

compared with those in the urban areas, rural communities feel both marginalised and inferior when compared to their urban counterparts. These sentiments are reinforced by perceptions that the government is not undertaking sufficient measures to address these inequalities, especially concerning the poor quality of primary and secondary schools since schools are viewed as foundational blocks for transforming rural areas. Marginalisation is both an internal process, where rural citizens feel they will never be able to attain the same opportunities and wealth as their urban counterparts, as well as an external process where rural citizens hold the perception that urban citizens view them as inferior. These processes are similarly reinforced on the side of the urban citizens, whose experiences with rural citizens can reinforce generalized perceptions and stereotypes - hence perceptions continue to divide citizens and exacerbate their differences instead of highlighting the common and unifying traits and beliefs.

#### 8.3.5 The racial and cultural divide

Misperceptions about different race, class, and social groups fuel stereotypes and perceptions that access to services and opportunities especially education, health, and employment are disproportionately allocated to specific groups over others. Participants keenly noted that these perceptions are mainly rooted in the absence of exposure to, understandings of, and engagements with their fellow residents' cultures, practices, and beliefs.

#### 8.3.6 The generational divide

Generalizations and stereotypical perceptions also negatively affect the relational balance and understanding between the modern and traditional in KZN. Youth participants in particular highlighted that they were attempting to carve their own space in what was clearly viewed as a dichotomous choice between modern and traditional lifestyles. The dominant perceptions of what traditional culture constituted became closely associated with one's identity as a member of a particular race or ethnic group, and thus adherence to this strict perception of culture become a defining point of one's identity, regardless of whether it was how the individual wished to express him- or herself. This challenge is amplified by the realities that all cultures continuously evolve and transform, and thus make highly contestable the arguments that individuals who fail to conform are less authentic. However, these individuals have to navigate a terrain where they feel ostracized and isolated if they fail to conform to

these perceptions. This breeds resentment and prevents the development of a cohesive, tolerant, and equal society.

### 8.3.7 HIV/AIDS

A further harmful perception that persists is the stigma around HIV/AIDS. A written submission identified HIV/AIDS as a threat to social cohesion in society, especially in rural areas. “There is a lot of stigma surrounding this disease and the dominant belief is that promiscuous women are the cause of it and men are the victims”, asserts the writer of the submission.

### 8.3.8 Disability

Misperceptions around disability are a powerful hindrance to the mainstreaming of the disabled into social and economic life. A view emerged that “a disabled person is always belittled in many ways...it is not common to find a disabled person in decision-making levels, even if they get employed...” Representatives of disabled persons’ organisations asserted that social cohesion cannot be viewed in isolation from the issues affecting the disabled. Participants felt that consistently negative perceptions of the disabled, such as that the disabled are ‘welfare cases’ and not contributing members of society, hamper this group’s progress in society.

### 8.3.9 Language

Another dimension of socio-economic inequalities that greatly perpetuates social divides throughout KZN relates to the imbalances between the English and Zulu languages in daily life. Zulu is the predominant mother tongue language, spoken in approximately 78% of homes compared with English, which is mother tongue in only 13% of households (Statistics South Africa, 2011). In this light, participants noted that in spite of the prominence of the Zulu language, the majority of interactions with government by necessity take place in English. Participants recalled challenges when Zulu speaking citizens felt marginalised because there was a dearth of multi-lingual signs and they also could not engage English-speaking officials in the Province’s Home Affairs or Department of Transport offices, for example. This language-divide fuels tensions both due to the logistical challenges citizens

face as well as the emergent perceptions that government officials remain apathetic and complacent towards the citizenry. Participants also recalled the 2012 Durban taxi strikes and the drivers' grievances over the English/Zulu language divide in law enforcement as examples of the language-driven forces that can inhibit social cohesion.

#### 8.3.10 Gender and Power Relations

The power asymmetry between men and women is one of the key divides in society, and in its own way presents a challenge to social cohesion. Participants related difficulties in bringing into alignment their roles in the broader society and those in the home, for example. "We cannot accommodate our legal roles with our cultural roles, as culture has not adapted sufficiently to allow us to live out the constitutional values (of equality, for example) in the home". According to the same participant, "We talk about empowering women, but we never talk about empowering men: we are empowered to act in their field, but they are never empowered to act in our field." Thought should be given to the impact of challenging this equilibrium, especially as more women become breadwinners. Participants asserted that we need to think about how we negotiate our spaces, and we also need to guard against passing off as 'traditional' practices that were only recently invented to preserve unhealthy power dynamics. These dynamics also impact upon the structure of the family: a key instrument in forging social cohesion. Women's increasing participation in the labour force means that new demands are being placed on the domestic division of labour. Participants agreed that this is a critical discussion for South African policymakers in the context of social cohesion, and that it would be important to ascertain the degree of agreement on norms and values across generations.

A number of participants and submissions pointed to pervasive patriarchal relations in many communities – which also run along racial and class lines – despite the equality of all before the law as well as distinct legal provisions specifically protecting the rights of women and children. The power imbalances between men and women contribute greatly to divisions between large segments of society, and instil overwhelming fear and insecurity in many environments. The unacceptably high levels of psychological and physical violence committed against women and children, especially in terms of rape and domestic abuse, were linked to a number of conditions apparent throughout KZN, including significant unresolved trauma especially in men, as well as their feeling threatened by shifts towards women's

greater socio-economic independence both within the family context as well as within society at large. Evidence of deeply seated trauma revolves around the violent legacy of apartheid, during which violence became endemic in all parts of life. Given that many individuals in today's KZN were both direct victims of violence during apartheid as well as part of the armed resistance movements, it was put forward that many men as well as women today have not completely resolved the damaging legacy of the pervasive and institutionalised violence. As a result, they externalize this trauma and violence, deeply affecting those in their immediate lives.

#### 8.3.11 Absence of Shared Values

Participants in the consultations identified a number of issues resulting from the absence of shared values throughout the Province. These include the rise of materialism and consumerism (which featured in a number of discussions), a decline in morality and an emphasis of individualism over 'ubuntu', a lack of respect, and widespread prejudices. The rise of materialism and consumerism in particular led to gross inequalities. Participants noted that while inequality may be a feature of many societies, extreme economic inequality as evidenced in the Province and South Africa at large today, represent a key threat not only to social cohesion but also to stability in the country. Materialism is seen to be rooted in the pervasive socio-economic inequalities throughout KZN and is perceived as a "selfish way of living." This materialism, which makes individuals value expensive goods such as cars and luxury items as indicators of social status, promotes individual benefit over the pursuit of the common good. Consumerism was also thought to breed resentment and jealousy. Participants felt that an immense amount of pressure to live up to impossible standards is generated by advertising. Some participants argued that the ethos of *ubuntu* that rose to prominence in the euphoria following South Africa's 1994 transition to democracy was no longer apparent in KZN. Inequalities along with misperceptions of fellow community members had become so divisive that there was no longer an emphasis on core moral values, such as tolerance and respect for others, that underscore all faiths and societies.

Another manifestation of the absence of shared values is political intolerance, which in the context of KZN remains most prominent, as evidenced by relatively frequent political assassinations and heightened competition for popular political support, as well as through intolerance derived from heightened competition over the distribution of economic resources.

The absence of shared values also constitutes an important social and cultural phenomenon. Participants pointed to the evolving nature of culture within modern-day KZN and sought to assess how shared values influenced daily life for individuals and communities. Such debates emerged concerning the accommodation of and clashes between conceptions of modern and traditional culture, as well as questioning whether shared values are passed from generation to generation.

Respondents cited prejudice as a corollary to the absence of shared values. They felt that identity-driven prejudices and the absence of shared values constitute noticeable threats to social cohesion. Throughout the discussions, these prejudices were cited as they applied to a number of distinct identity markers, including: race, class, gender and sexual orientation, generational standing, geographical origins, and cultural conceptualisation (e.g. traditional versus modern). Crucially, these prejudices manifest themselves as a result of the continued inequitable distribution of resources and individuals' unequal access to opportunities. Although this inequitable distribution originates in the racial and economic stratification employed during the apartheid era, it continues to be a prominent challenge for the country's democratic dispensation. Prejudices across diverse identity markers negatively impact how individuals strive to achieve both greater socio-economic standing and also form part of a cohesive KZN society. Prejudices directly and indirectly contribute to the formation of negative perceptions individuals hold of their own as well as of other communities.

Prejudices similarly manifest themselves as stereotypes along identity lines, whether through gender, racial, or ethnicity-based stereotypes. The xenophobic tensions that exploded in 2008 and have resurfaced in 2015 continue in some parts of the Province constitute extreme and urgent manifestations of specific prejudices held against non-South Africans. For example, prejudices held against Somali tuck-shop owners across the Province's townships are rooted in perceptions that Somali shop owners steal economic opportunities from South Africans. Research reveals, however, that Somali traders have in the past employed a collaborative cost-sharing strategy with their countrymen that reduced their per-unit costs and made their businesses more viable relative to their South African peers (The Economist, March 22, 2014). Thus, while Somali traders do in reality have differential access to resources for entrepreneurship, this is due to their kinship arrangements, it would seem, and not due to preferential treatment from the KZN government, for example. Yet, the perception exists that members of different racial or ethnic communities have differential access to the resources that can assist them to succeed in business.

Other manifestations of prejudices include more prominent actions such as verbal harassment and overt discrimination as well as subtle and unintentional discriminatory actions. One example highlighted in the consultations was that when Black and White partners frequent restaurants, the White partner would always be handed the bill despite the Black partner having a significantly higher income. Other manifestations include the inconsistent application of the country's equality and human rights laws, especially vis-à-vis gender equality in traditional settings, as well as the preservation and reinforcement of unequal social dynamics.

### 8.3.12 Substance Abuse

The community-wide impacts of prevalent substance abuse in the Province, specifically in terms of alcohol and drugs (i.e. cannabis, *tik*, and *whoonga*), were identified as another significant threat to social cohesion. This challenge was raised prominently by the KZN Provincial Government. Substance abuse intersects dimensions of health, social development, education, and community security domains, while nonetheless rooted in long-term structural factors of poverty, unemployment, and organised crime, especially within marginalised and disadvantaged communities. Among participants in the consultations, alcohol- and drug-abuse were routinely cited as potential drivers of violent behaviour, among other threats to social cohesion. Among refugees, building commonality around drugs or other substances was cited as a way of feeling part of a larger community than oneself. While participants acknowledged that it was perhaps difficult to quantify substance abuse among refugees, for example, they agreed that this was a factor in high levels of gender-based violence and child neglect evident in the refugee community. Drugs were also mentioned as a threat to social cohesion by civil society groups consulted.

Individuals and their communities are most vulnerable to the challenges emanating from sustained substance abuse. Substance abuse constitutes both medical and psychosocial vulnerabilities to individuals, who not only risk medical harm from abusing alcohol and drugs, but are also more at risk for other communicable diseases, more at risk to engage in criminal activities and undertake violent behaviours. Substance abuse also leaves the family unit vulnerable as it can fuel interpersonal conflicts and trauma between individual family members and even lead to violence and health risks to partners, children, and other direct relatives. Further, substance abuse is likely to perpetuate psychosocial damage to the



individual at risk as they are likely to face social marginalisation as a result of their sustained substance abuse, given that additions may force families and communities to isolate individuals if their substance abuse manifests negatively upon others. Further, the challenges from substance abuse also leave communities vulnerable to increases in violent crimes and unrest.

#### 8.3.13 Civic Education and Awareness

A number of participants raised the issue of civic education and awareness in weighing the factors that impact on social cohesion. This centred on a number of issues, including: awareness of South Africa's struggle history; civic education and understanding of public policy processes; a general sensitization concerning the national government's immigration policies and foreign policy to place the presence of refugees in communities into context; and awareness of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

#### 8.3.14 Discussion

Extensive literature and policy debates surveyed highlight the importance of specific socio-cultural attitudes and behaviours in forging greater social cohesion, such as those of belonging, respect, coexistence, and tolerance. Further, the South African government has emphasised the importance of forging a national identity and promoting 'unity in diversity' with respect to advancing social cohesion.

Data collected by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation's 2013 Reconciliation Barometer survey showed that South African respondents described their primary identities according to: language (23.2%), race (13.4%), neighbourhood (12.0%), ethnicity (11.1%), class (8.8%), South African nationality (7.1%), and religion (6.0%), thus noting that there remain a number of identity-driven barriers towards forging a cohesive and prevalent South African national identity (IJR, 2013).

Other important manifestations of socio-cultural threats include the perceived loss of shared values. Shared values remain important in the context of social cohesion in South Africa, and specifically in recognition of the Province's rich diversity of cultures and peoples, as well as the acknowledged desires to promote greater mutual acceptance, equality, and cohesiveness throughout society (The Presidency, 2004; Department of Arts and Culture, 2012; Struwig et

al, 2012; MISTRA, 2014). In its 2012 Social Cohesion Strategy, the Department of Arts and Culture enumerates shared values as follows:

*[I]n societies with diverse cultures it is to be expected there will be diverse and even divergent values. It is thus important for citizens to subscribe to a basic set of shared values such as democracy, freedom, equality, justice and mutual respect.*

Other references to shared values include those values of the South African constitution such as non-racialism and non-sexism, as well as fairness, respect for others, and a commitment to human rights.

Available data points to mixed conclusions concerning agreement over shared values. On the one hand, available survey data from across South Africa point to broad-based support for key shared values such as democracy, non-racialism, and tolerance. The 2013 IJR Reconciliation Barometer notes that 55% of South Africans support or strongly voice their desire for a united South Africa, while 53.6% agree that it remains possible to create a united South Africa (IJR, 2013). The 5th Round of Afrobarometer Surveys on South Africa indicates broad support for South Africa's democracy as the best style of governance, although the 2014 South African Social Attitudes Survey concludes that just over half the population (51%) is unsatisfied with the state of democracy in South Africa, and only 33% were satisfied with the way democracy is working (HSRC, 2014). Private survey company Future Fact concluded in its research that over 80% of South Africans surveyed are comfortable with people of the same class, status or education regardless of their race, while 80% believe that all South Africans can co-exist peacefully without losing their cultural identity (Future Fact, 2014).

The consequences of prevalent societal threats impact upon society at large. At a micro level, prejudices limit individuals' space for defining their own identity and self-expression. When prejudices constrain individuals to certain narrow identity markers and specific traits and characteristics, individuals struggle to imagine their own possibilities beyond these constraints. These form concrete disincentives that inhibit individuals from striving to achieve their potential or to push the boundaries beyond such narrow constructs. These prejudices have further contributed to increased social stratification and marginalisation along narrow identity lines, especially in terms of gender and sexual orientation, geographical location, and class. Gender and sexual orientation driven prejudices rooted in the continued prevalence of patriarchal practices across many communities in KZN, highlight how negative

prejudices can result in stigmatisation and marginalisation. This marginalisation occurs not only on social and cultural levels, but also extends into the economic spheres. The specific prejudices that manifest in widespread gender and sexual orientation-driven stigmatization have led to profound economic inequalities and have perpetuated domestic violence (World Economic Forum, 2013; Musariri et al, 2014). These forms of violent discrimination (especially domestic and sexual abuse) constitute the most extreme consequences that can emerge from unaddressed and entrenched negative prejudices. Despite the proactive and comprehensive human rights legislation enshrined in the Constitution, negative prejudices continue to raise significant threats to achieving greater social cohesion.

Any deterioration of shared values, whether social, cultural, or political, is likely to place significant strain on the Province's communal relations. The growth of consumerism and materialism are threatening in a context of pervasive poverty. These phenomena must be contextualised within the broader realities of socio-economic inequalities, wealth disparities, and incidents of corruption and undue benefit. Such challenges detract from the sense of shared community and result in the growing perceptions that those who benefit are increasingly removed from the challenges faced by ordinary individuals. Further, the rise of identity-driven prejudices and intolerance remains of urgent consequence to the Province for their potential roles in inciting violence. Such intolerance, whether political, racial, ethnic, or community-based, can be directly linked with the broader inequitable distribution of political power and economic resources throughout the Province. The consequences of these manifestations can be observed in the continued prevalence of political violence throughout the Province (specifically related to the ANC/IFP violence in the hostels and townships in the eThekweni Municipality, and the IFP/NFP violence) (Democracy Development Programme, 2012; Lancaster and Naickerdien, 2014; Mkhize, 2014; SAPA, 2014a; Sosibo, 2014).

All segments of society in KZN remain vulnerable to the impacts of socio-cultural threats to social cohesion. Those individuals who are discriminated against remain the most vulnerable to the threats posed by negative prejudices, and are vulnerable to marginalisation and isolation, psychosocial trauma, and in the most serious of cases, physical violence. These vulnerabilities also extend into geographical communities based upon certain identity markers. Whereas some identity markers only manifest themselves amongst individuals (e.g. generation, physical disability, gender and sexual orientation), others can be attributed to larger subsets of individuals and communities (e.g. race, ethnicity, class, language, geographical location). Examples drawn from the consultations with KZN's refugee and

migrant communities highlight how negative prejudices are reinforced through the actions of individuals as well as government institutions, private sector entities, and the media. These work, at times, to incite tensions between immigrants and South Africans, but also amongst the migrant and refugee communities. Negative perceptions can thus not only divide communities but further isolate them from contributing to a cohesive society. Private sector actors also remain vulnerable to the negative consequences of entrenched prejudices: companies run by individuals who are discriminated against due to narrow identity markers may lose customers, and in extreme instances, confront violent attacks that seek to destroy their businesses. Finally, government institutions can be threatened by the entrenchment of negative prejudices throughout society, specifically through individuals perceiving that government is not responding sufficiently or effectively to create an inclusive environment for all individuals in the Province through its legislative and policy implementation processes. This in turn contributes to a perceived loss of legitimacy and effectiveness of government institutions.

One important derivative of this analysis is the continued prevalence and consequences of political intolerance in evidence throughout the Province. Political intolerance and politically motivated violence have been persistent phenomena throughout KZN since the outbreak of widespread political violence throughout the 1980s. Political intolerance and intimidation are evidenced through individuals employing manipulation and threats, interfering with political meetings, assaults and threats of physical harm, and the denial of jobs and services to people of different political affiliations (Bruce 2014a: 3). Politically-linked assassinations are also a prominent but alarming feature of the KZN political environment: more than 90% of politically-motivated killings in South Africa since 1994 have taken place in the Province, numbering close to 450 deaths (Bruce 2014b). It is important to note that overall trends in political violence have declined in recent years, although isolated incidents continue to emerge in hotspots throughout the province. Prominent political tensions exist at both the inter-party and intra-party levels, and previous incidents have involved members of the ANC, the IFP, the National Freedom Party (NFP), and the Congress of the People (COPE) political parties.

Political intolerance and political violence are rooted in a number of interrelated factors that occur specifically around elections as well as in the longer-term political environment. For many individuals, political positions are the only means of accessing political influence, sustained incomes, and lucrative employment opportunities. This consequently places a very

high value on retaining or securing these positions by all means necessary, including through violence. Further, politically motivated violence can also be linked to issues such as corruption, business dealings, and incidents of mutual distrust (DDP, 2012). KZN officials remain alert and active in responding to the threats posed by political intolerance. Government leaders, political figures, and community activists alike actively promote political tolerance and strive to build greater communal cohesion to avert these challenges. However, it is unlikely that these incidents can be eliminated completely until greater socio-economic development and equality can be achieved in communities vulnerable to political violence.

The 2012-13 South African Police Services (SAPS) Crime Statistics Analysis highlights that between 2011-2 and 2012-3, drug related crimes in KwaZulu-Natal increased from 37,415 cases to 42,167 cases while crimes relating to individuals driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs increased from 12,867 to 15,112 cases. (SAPS, 2013) Further, The South African Community Epidemiology Network on Drug Use (SACENDU) analyses of drug and alcohol trends in 2013 drew the following conclusions from the data collected at its provincial treatment centres: that of the 934 individuals to seek treatment in the Province, 64% were between the ages of 10-30; that alcohol constituted over 50% of participants' primary substance of abuse, cannabis approximately 30%, and crack cocaine and heroin (sugars) constituted 06% each (SACENDU, 2014.) In a press release put forward by the National Department of Social Development, "According to Child Care South Africa – a child protection and youth development initiative, which seeks to enhance the capacity of young people in rural areas in KZN – the province tops national statistics in terms of youth drug/alcohol abuse. Among the hotspots for alcohol and substance abuse in KwaZulu Natal is the uThungulu District Municipality" (DSD, 2014).

In its 2013-2017 National Drug Master Plan, the South African Government's Department of Social Development crucially acknowledges that abuses of alcohol and drugs impact individuals, families, and communities at large, and are linked to damaging psychological, health, social, and economic costs, as well as the perpetuation of violent crimes within and between communities (DSD, 2013). Multi-dimensional responses and interventions spearheaded by both the National and Provincial Government and a host of medical and community-based initiatives have sought to comprise medical and psychosocial rehabilitation support, longer-term education programmes, and efforts to support community safety efforts and eradicate organised criminal networks that perpetuate, with the government framing their

efforts as the intersection between combatting the supply, demand, and harm of substance abuse (DSD, 2013).

#### 8.4 Institutions and approaches that strengthen social cohesion

Participants in the consultations identified the following as institutions that strengthen social cohesion:

- The media is a key institution with a role to play in promoting social cohesion. The media has a responsibility to give exposure to different views, and promote positive social values and ethos. The media has an added responsibility not to inflame conflict situations through its reporting. While the idea of providing mainly ‘sunshine journalism’ should be avoided, great effort should be made to highlight examples of successful social cohesion.
- The Provincial Legislature is an important platform for engagement that must be taken seriously, and its functions and work publicised and made as accessible as possible. Oversight institutions must do their work objectively and fairly and not be used to settle political differences.
- Faith-based organisations also assist in mitigating tensions at times, by the opportunities they provide for their own followers of different races to come together for worship, social outreach, and community building activities; also by creating opportunities for people of different faiths to be exposed to each other’s practices and beliefs, and also by providing joint assistance to those in need.
- The improvement of access to quality education for all is of central importance in strengthening social cohesion. Educational institutions are also important in cultivating values that emphasise the social and collective elements of society, and reducing the primacy of the individual and crass materialism.
- There is little question that social support grants help to ease social tensions, as many of the grants have actually saved lives and brought people from the brink of poverty. These grants should not, however, be seen as an alternative to employment. Wherever

possible, opportunities should be created for people to be paid a fair wage for doing work.

- Dialogue is an important approach that assists in alleviating social tensions. The absence of meaningful dialogue between citizens throughout the province, and between government and citizens is a significant threat to social cohesion. Participants in a number of consultations agreed that many prevalent social tensions are deeply rooted in a lack of understanding and exposure to lives that are different to one's own. The absence of this exposure leads to more generalised and negative perceptions of experiences that are different, thus exacerbating those factors that divide citizens.
- Dialogue with the youth is of crucial importance. Discussing the complexities of apartheid and the liberation struggle, as well as their impact on the current socio-economic and political context was viewed by the youth formations in particular as central to promoting greater unity in KZN and greater support for South Africa's democratic dispensation. These discussions must start in earnest at school level, and continue throughout life, through public awareness. The contribution of all race groups to the struggle to end apartheid must be recognised. Likewise, the impact of apartheid on all race groups must be scrutinised.
- Cultural events hosted by the Province are a good idea in principle, but these events should be held at more central locations and be more accommodating in terms of scheduling and time-keeping if they are intended to attract a more diverse participation. They should not be turned into party political rallies, as current perceptions suggest.
- Cultural awareness programmes, such as open-house sessions and immersion programmes work well in building communities' awareness of each other. The Methodist Church, for example, has a women's movement that empowers women from the rural areas, restoring dignity and helping them to make significant career progress. Several faith-based organisations also host the 'Healing of Memories' programme.
- Sporting activities can play the dual role of bringing people together and creating employment. One author of a written submission asserted that while serving as a

volunteer at the 2010 World Cup, he experienced a profound sense of social cohesion, patriotism, and common identity.

- Peace monitoring, of the kind that took place during the transition from apartheid, is another approach that could improve social cohesion, as protesters are made aware that their protest is valid, but also that it is subject to responsible conduct on the part of both the protesters and law enforcement.
- The creation of ‘safe spaces’ where people can feel free to debate and discuss: this could refer to both physical and social space. This was thought to be of particular relevance for Integrated Development Planning (IDP), for example. There was a strong belief among participants that there is a need for genuine public participation in setting the agenda and outcomes for IDPs.
- Visible responsiveness by the Province’s leadership. Some people, as is evidenced by violent protest, doubt the value and effectiveness of the democratic process. People’s faith in democracy should be vindicated by government responsiveness long before they resort to violence. Government officials should take all letters, memorandums, petitions and delegations much more seriously.
- Government transparency and accountability, by engendering the trust of the province’s population, was seen as another way to strengthen social cohesion.
- Land reform was seen as a means of strengthening social cohesion by providing employment and livelihoods for rural dwellers. According to a written submission, “The manner in which land reform is handled is vital component to achieving (and) maintaining social cohesion in rural KZN”. This was seen as key because rural inhabitants’ frustrations are high at the slow pace of land reform.



## 9 Conclusions

The Special Committee's investigation sought to identify and assess the threats to social cohesion in KZN, to determine these threats' underlying causes and dynamics, and to provide recommendations to the Provincial Government's Executive Council towards strengthening their policies and interventions. Consultations, interviews, and written submissions constituted the core methodology of this investigation, so that the Special Committee could uncover the lived experiences and current impressions and perceptions of individuals across a diverse range of communities and interest-based formations throughout the province. This primary data was then interrogated against a comprehensive survey of academic and policy-oriented literature that engages the concept of social cohesion, as well as readings of the province's unique socio-economic and political histories during the pre- and post-apartheid eras.

The chosen method of analysis enables the Special Committee's investigation to account for, contextualise, and explain the current dynamics evidenced throughout the Province, and crucially, how they impact on the pursuit of a more socially cohesive society. Although this investigation cannot claim to cover exhaustively all stakeholders and perspectives in KZN, nor sufficiently detail every academic and policy debate on social cohesion, it situates its contributions as a representative overview of the Province.

On the basis of the data collected, and analysis done in the course of the investigation it is the conclusion of the Special Committee that a more socially cohesive society is fundamentally dependent upon how KZN pursues greater socio-economic equality and how it promotes higher degrees of mutual acceptance within and between its diverse communities. This conclusion is based upon three central findings. First, colonialism and apartheid socially engineered skills, capital and opportunities, leaving South Africa with a legacy of poverty, unemployment and inequality. Second, 21 years after the securing of democratic governance in South Africa, the challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequality persist: although poverty has been reduced statistically (through social grants and other interventions) unemployment, inequality and relative deprivation have grown, impacting negatively on social cohesion. And third, despite corrective interventions from both National and Provincial government structures since 1994, which have resulted in many positive outcomes across KZN, there have been unintended consequences that have also contributed negatively to

social cohesion. The discussion below highlights the most salient and urgent of the identified threats to social cohesion that emerged from the investigation.

## 9.1 Structural Threats Conclusions

**Structural Threats:** The investigation has shown that structural threats present urgent challenges to mutual acceptance in the context of KZN, one of the definitive goals of social cohesion. Historically, differentiated discrimination underpinned inter-racial tensions in the Province. The Special Committee observed that many of the participants within the consultations placed emphases on class standing and socio-economic issues, as well as racial dynamics, as important mediums of self- and communal-identification. As so many discussions focused primarily on socio-economic and class-driven experiences, the Special Committee has been further enlightened by the salience of structural inequalities and how they impact upon individuals' perceptions of themselves and of those around them. Amongst the identified structural threats to social cohesion, the following should receive the most urgent consideration:

***Socio-economic inequalities:*** The urgency of reducing socio-economic inequalities emerged as central to the pursuit of greater social cohesion in KZN. This dimension has wide and varied impacts upon all aspects of human life. In a society characterised by deep inequality, high rates of poverty and unemployment, the economic dimension of social cohesion cannot be underplayed. In various contexts, ranging from inequality, the broadening gap between 'haves' and 'have-nots', education, and unemployment, participants perceived socio-economic issues to be the number one threat to social cohesion in the Province. The challenges facing KZN's socio-economic landscape, while rooted in colonialism and apartheid, appear to participants to have been compounded over the last twenty-one years of democratic governance. The threats from this category manifest in a range of inequalities that affect not only how people live today, but crucially, their opportunities, and those of their children, for improving their life chances. KZN's comparatively high poverty rates, with over 26% of the country's impoverished population resident in this province, disaggregates to over 56,3% of KZN inhabitants living in poverty (Stats SA, 2014c: 31). Buttressed by alarmingly high rates of income inequality throughout the country (as quantified

by the country's gini-coefficient indicators) socio-economic inequalities further underpin the extent to which KZN remains a structurally unequal society.

***Unequal access to quality education:*** Challenges of individuals' access to schooling as well as the quality of education within primary and secondary institutions contribute to the structural threats of social cohesion. Discussions throughout this study continuously pointed to what participants perceived as disparities in the education system as central to the underlying socio-economic inequalities. Divisions between those learners who have access to quality education, and those who do not, largely remain predicated along the historical lines of marginalization that defined the apartheid era, namely race, socio-economic status, and geographic location. The disadvantages of unequal access to both quality instruction and extra-curricular support are most readily observed within the teaching of mathematics, English, science and commerce. Despite the KZN Department of Education's efforts to improve the Province's education system radically, more broadly these challenges will take many years, if not decades, to rectify fundamentally. As identified earlier, although skilled employment has grown as a proportion of total employment since 1994, uneven and marginal gains in skills development, especially within the Black African community, remain significant contributors to high levels of poverty, unemployment, and socio-economic inequalities (Statistics SA, 2014a).

***Infrastructure deficits:*** Participants noted that the spatial legacies of apartheid in KZN have yet to be resolved and continue to exacerbate tensions that threaten social cohesion. Despite best efforts to increase the provision of public housing, increase spending on infrastructure and ensure the reliable provision of basic services, participants perceived continued inequalities within KZN's townships, peri-urban communities, shacks and transit camps. These spatial inequalities contribute to unequal access to basic housing, education, health services, utilities, and gainful permanent employment opportunities. Participants highlighted that these fuel perceptions throughout society of an 'us versus them' mentality. It should be noted, however, that in terms of the layout of residential areas, divisions that were historically based upon race, are now increasingly based on class. These deficits continue to define individuals' lived day-to-day experiences strongly and have impacted upon individuals' psychological and material well-being.

## 9.2 Institutional Threats Conclusion

**Institutional Threats:** Institutional threats identified by participants not only heighten and exacerbate zero-sum competition over political power and influence, but also amplify the structural economic inequities and negative prejudices and marginalisation of various communities. Differentiated access to economic opportunities according to race and class run the risk of providing the basis of intolerance. Certain participants also saw political affiliation as a means of pursuing economic advancement. For example, the utterances by interest groups must be seen in the context of an expectation that since 1994, Black economic aspirations would be met on a broad scale. However, competition over political power should not be seen as exclusively racial, but rather based upon economic inequality. Where such inequality is perceived to be tied to corruption, participants felt all the more aggrieved. It is worth noting that, as in many other such experiences nationally and globally, anger in this instance is directed not at the main, erstwhile historical beneficiaries of privilege (the White community and specifically White capital); but at those beneficiaries who are seen as closer in terms of ethnicity and to whom those who are angry are most exposed in the course of everyday life. Amongst the identified institutional threats to social cohesion, the following should receive the most urgent consideration:

***Racialised economic competition:*** The racialised and inequitable economic competition perceived amongst citizens of KZN was central to the discussions of social cohesion. Participants expressed serious concerns and reservations about existing structures, policies, and practices related to government procurement and the environment for small and medium businesses in the Province. Different stakeholders questioned the repeated awarding of tenders to select individuals and companies, suggesting that a supposed equitable and fair process is instead characterised by pervasive economic and political patronage. Many of the identified institution-oriented interventions to promote skills development amongst the Province's Black communities, especially in terms of strengthening best business practices and strengthening individuals' and companies' capacities to compete for large tender opportunities, were perceived to be ineffective or requiring greater financial and political commitment. There exists a very strong perception that Indians, in addition

to the structural advantages, are also favoured by existing policy provisions in the Provincial business environment at the expense of Africans. Discussions, for instance, focused upon the racialised character of economic competition throughout KZN, especially in terms of access to government tenders, economic opportunities and financial capital. These tensions emanated specifically from between the province's Black and Indian communities, as well as from South Africans and foreign nationals residing in KZN.

***Relations between government and citizens under pressure:*** Corruption in the public sector constituted a focal point in exacerbating tensions in the Province. Corruption, in both political and economic spheres of public service and the private sector, manifested in the poor distribution of resources, in poor service delivery, compromised decision-making, irregular procurement, and ultimately in the diminished legitimacy of institutions. Perceived gaps in communication between the Provincial government and citizens further exacerbated the threats relating to the lack of accountability in public governance. Slow responses to citizens' grievances, intermittent communication and dialogue, especially in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public policy initiatives were central to these challenges. Further, the lack of coherent action between different government departments was also cited by participants as weakening efforts to strengthen social cohesion.

### 9.3 Societal Threats Conclusion

**Societal Threats:** Participants identified societal-oriented threats to social cohesion, especially through the entrenchment of negative, identity-driven perceptions within and between communities. Virtually all of the literature on social cohesion, ranging from Tabane and Human-Vogel (2010) and Green and Janmaat (2011) to the World Bank (2012), OECD (2011), and Struwig et al (2012) underscore the importance of shared values, belonging, and consensus in forging a cohesive society. However, the urgency of promoting greater levels of socio-cultural cohesion should not explicitly translate into a need for articulating a single, all-inclusive identity. KZN remains a diverse province, rich in various cultures, identities, and histories. Whereas some support exists for the forging of a single South African identity based on shared heritage, values, and beliefs, these socio-cultural processes are weakened by

profound socio-economic inequalities and heightened competition over political power and influence, which was explicitly perceived to underpin how socio-economic opportunities and resources are distributed. Amongst the identified societal threats to social cohesion, the following should receive the most urgent consideration:

***Perceptions, stigmas, and biases:*** Whether prejudices are based on the markers of language, race, class, or geography, their prevalence within individuals and communities highlights stark divisions concerning who benefits from the current structures of society in KZN, and who is left on the margins. Whereas certain prejudices result from unaddressed structural socio-economic legacies, they are further reinforced and exacerbated by the decisions and policies implemented during the democratic era. These prejudices constitute significant threats to progress regardless of whether they emerge from factual and evidence-based conclusions or from individuals' and communities' lived experiences and perceptions of society at large. Negative prejudices, especially along identity lines, represent the lowest common denominators for many individuals across society's broader spectrum. Whereas each person's experiences may differ, these prejudices can unite and mobilise communities rapidly in the context of disproportionate and undue social marginalisation and isolation.

#### 9.4 Contextualising threats and responses to social cohesion

These threats, amongst others, in their totality contribute towards prevalent feelings of marginalisation and exclusion throughout the Province. Whether premised on specific economic grievances, broader contestations over political and civic governance, or feelings that the government and society at large benefit certain individuals and not others, various communities and interest groups in KZN do not yet see the realisation of a socially cohesive society.

Our investigation further established that the various threats to social cohesion are in fact multi-dimensional, interrelated, and mutually reinforcing. Structural socio-economic challenges constitute the foundation of threats to social cohesion, but also influence, perpetuate, and exacerbate distinct institutional and societal threats and grievances. These

threats, in large part, manifest as a direct result of large degrees of inequity and exclusion, as well as heightened competition over limited economic opportunities and resources. If left unattended the structural threats, which include socio-economic inequalities, poverty, inequitable access to quality education, unemployment and the lasting legacy of apartheid spatial planning, may in the medium-term result in higher levels of social unrest and deprivation, together with their attendant challenges. In the longer-term, government and society become increasingly vulnerable to stagnant and diminishing human capital, a diminishing consumer base and various social ills associated with social exclusion.

There is another dimension of inequality that is specific to countries in the process of development, namely the tenuous position of the emergent middle strata, in the case of South Africa affecting especially the Coloured and African groups. Analysts have shown how the application of the term 'middle class' to a society such as South Africa's is not congruent with its use in the developed world. This is because the incomes characteristic of 'middle class' in South Africa represent merely a middle band between the rich and poor extremes. In OECD member countries, for example, 'middle class' is representative of higher levels of income and high levels of education and skills. The emergence of this 'middle income group' in developing states such as South Africa, furthermore, tends to have its own dynamic, resulting in new forms of social anomie or dislocation characterised by high levels of indebtedness, relative poverty of new entrants to this group compared with their established, often White counterparts, pressures of maintaining costly lifestyles, combined with expectations from extended family, and other financial strains. It is important to note that disquiet from this class, broadly conceived, is important to take note of, as similarly to the traditionally conceived 'middle class', it is still able to influence the content and tone of public discourse through engagement with traditional and social media, for example.

Heightened prejudices and intolerant attitudes, whether evidenced along lines of language, race, class, ethnicity, or geography, emerge from individuals' lived experiences and perceptions that narrow identity markers limit their social and economic opportunities. Similarly, urgent threats emerging from the institutional context, such as the racialised economic competition and compromised relations between government and citizens, heightened competition for political power, and anger over corruption and maladministration emerge in direct relation to the realities that certain individuals continue to benefit disproportionately over others.

It is crucial to acknowledge the complexity of these challenges and the interrelated ways in which structural, institutional, and societal threats manifest and amplify each other. Further, recent examples of collective mobilisation, racist and xenophobic rhetoric, and violent outbursts across KZN's communities highlight the gravity of these threats with respect to achieving greater social cohesion, and more broadly, to achieving widespread stability and prosperity throughout the province. Although at present, these threats have only resulted in isolated, but nonetheless serious, outbreaks of violent mobilisation, the potential for further unrest remains a real and present concern.

With the Province's current widespread socio-economic inequalities as a foundation, and compromised relations between the citizenry and the government as factors that compound these inequalities, the continued replication and reinforcement of negative prejudices within and between communities as well as between the populace and the government, threaten to motivate more communities and interest groups to mobilise so as to make their voices heard and combat their lived experiences of social stratification and marginalisation.

These challenges become all the more pressing upon recognition that the Provincial Government, and all of KZN society, is in a race against time to resolve these complex challenges. Current trends highlight that in the upcoming years, the Province and South Africa alike will confront increasing social, economic, and environmental pressures. The exponential increase of the country's population, rapid and unplanned urbanisation, technological demands and environmental degradation (especially reduced rainfall and higher cereal prices) will impede efforts to ensure that all persons of KZN can be provided with basic services. Structurally-rooted skills deficits and sustained levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality will only amplify the disparities between those citizens who can ensure their basic needs are met and the many more who will be affected negatively in the years to come. All of these dynamics point to the urgent need to resolve the underlying socio-economic challenges as a meaningful step in promoting greater social cohesion.

These conclusions, in many respects, echo those reached by both the HSRC and MISTRA in their recent studies on social cohesion within South Africa. Struwig et al (2012) highlight the interrelated and dynamic ways in which economic, politico-civic, and socio-cultural dimensions of social cohesion manifest in and exacerbate one another, whereas the recently undertaken MISTRA study concludes, "nation formation and social cohesion cannot be divorced from the economic and material needs and realities of a society" (MISTRA, 2014:



214). Many of the identified threats contained in this report are similarly echoed in the matrix of threats and challenges<sup>9</sup> developed by the Department of Arts and Culture (2012: 35-36) in its 2012 “National Strategy for Developing an Inclusive and a Cohesive South African Society”.

An important discussion must also revolve around the role of the KZN Provincial Government in striving to attain greater social cohesion. It remains important to acknowledge that the Provincial Government is an active and concerned stakeholder on these issues and across many sectors and spectrums has undertaken tangible policy efforts to redress the systematic socio-economic inequalities that lie at the heart of these identified threats. Further, recent initiatives on social policy and political accountability emphasise that the Provincial Government is not idle in its response to these challenges. From long term development trajectory anchored by the Provincial Growth and Development Plan 2011-2030 to targeted short and medium term interventions, for example OSS, the Provincial Government is working to redress many of the socio-economic challenges at the heart of the identified threats to social cohesion. Having said this, the evident strain in relations between the government and certain quarters of the citizenry exacerbates many of the underlying fault lines and tensions that government policy is striving to address. Widespread concerns about the lack of government communication during policy development periods, as well as an inconsistent approach to engaging citizens on the intentions, scheduled timeframes, and expected outcomes of key policy initiatives engender feelings of a growing gap between the people and the government.

The discussions with various stakeholders, drawn from a variety of sectors of KZN society, yielded spirited engagements with people who have thought at length about social cohesion in the Province. It is clear that participants were most concerned about socio-economic inequalities in KZN. They viewed these inequalities as the source of many tensions spanning economic, political and cultural life. Yet along with socio-economic inequality, as evidenced in differential quality of education and employment as well as the scourge of corruption, there was an underlying concern with the moral direction of society. A number of participants raised the issue that the trauma South Africa, and in particular KZN, experienced during the 1980s and 1990s, is unresolved, and this has consequences in the levels of violence exhibited

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<sup>9</sup> The identified threats include: socio-economic growth and transformation, unemployment, poverty and inequality, health, education, housing and land, crime and safety, gender, youth, xenophobia, corruption and service delivery, and social support. (DAC 2012: 35-36)

in society today. Violence is also, unfortunately, rewarded with media attention, and government action.

Crucially, the population of KZN desires to be heard, engaged, and embraced as legitimate stakeholders across a wide range of economic, political, social, and cultural policy issues. This report acknowledges that public policy processes are often not perfect, and that government will frequently be faced with complex choices, decisions that cannot please all stakeholders and interests, while unintended consequences of these processes may further influence desired and expected outcomes. It is when marginalisation becomes prominent that individuals feel they have no other option but to undertake public action to be heard and engaged. While peaceful public action must remain a vital component of South Africa's vibrant democratic society, the potential for violent outbreaks increases as individuals and communities become increasingly desperate to protect their inalienable rights and to be included in the society of KZN. Building greater social cohesion is dependent on greater societal inclusion long before sustained public action turns violent.

It is in this light that the Special Committee presents the below recommendations for consideration.

## 10 Recommendations

- **Revitalising policy provisions to promote more equitable economic development:** Central to the pursuit of greater social cohesion is the building of an inclusive and equitable economy. This requires an appropriate skills base, the injection of financial capital into SMMEs, greater articulation between SMMEs and larger businesses and institutions, and the reinforcement of public awareness campaigns to promote mechanisms and institutions that support skills development programmes and offer financial grants to fledgling businesses. Skills are essential for ensuring that individuals are aware of and can harness best business practices to operate the administrative and financial competencies of their businesses. These initiatives require sustained investment, over the immediate and long-term, into the Province's educational institutions (at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels) as well as through extra-curricular support that strengthens mathematics, science, and financial literacy skills. The increase of cohesion and collaboration between SMMEs and larger businesses, across industries, remains essential for domesticating supply chains and thereby promoting business opportunities that both provide individuals with a meaningful wage and contribute added value to the domestic economy.
- **Developing a more transparent and equitable tender system:** Greater transparency regarding the awarding of tenders is required to undercut any suspicion of corruption or wrongdoing in the area of government procurement. Transparency and merit should underpin the tender process right up to the awarding of the tender, with reasons publicised for the failure and success of bids. The Provincial Government should look specifically into the circumstances surrounding the repeated awarding of tenders to one individual or firm. Corporate actors and the government must make explicit commitments to the transfer of skills. Conditions could be stipulated in tender awards, for example, not only requiring the participation of Black companies, but also specifying the areas of skill they should be exposed to. For example, if a bank is awarded a government tender, exposing Black lawyers to banking law and thereby developing their skills could be a condition of the award of the tender.

- **Promoting peace education, building a culture of mutual acceptance, and encouraging trauma healing:** It is recommended that the KZN Provincial Government provide resources for peace education programmes in the Province. In addition, projects should be initiated at schools, community centres, religious institutions, and sports clubs that involve all South Africans, both young and old, in designing, implementing, and championing programmes which celebrate diversity in culture and society. Further, there is an urgent need to make widely available processes such as the “healing of memories” workshops referred to in this report, in which people are enabled to tell their stories of the violence they have experienced in a sympathetic environment of trust. While there are civil society and faith-based organisations which can and do provide such opportunities, in order to upscale these to the level needed to make an impact, we urge the provincial government to budget significant resources and to give every encouragement and support for the implementation of a coordinated plan.
- **Revamping the government’s social cohesion strategy:** The Provincial Government should spearhead the undertaking of a comprehensive 20-Year Review for the KZN Province, similar to the 20 Year Review undertaken in 2014 by The Presidency of South Africa, highlighting key achievements and shortcomings in key social, economic, and political sectors. The Province should further seek to undertake a multi-stakeholder dialogue towards developing a comprehensive and medium term Provincial Strategy for Social Cohesion. This strategy should take into account economic, social, political, and cultural dimensions of social cohesion. This strategy should be aligned with the frameworks and indicators contained within the Provincial Growth and Development Plan 2011-2030. A revised Provincial Strategy for Social Cohesion should be located in the Office of the Premier as a “special project”. Within Departments of Arts and Culture, for example, social cohesion projects end up very often being seen as cultural activities, while research, and the consultations leading to this Report, have shown that these issues are far wider, deeply implicated in political, social and economic issues.

- **Strengthening Communication and Dialogue within KZN:** The Provincial Government should strengthen its communications strategy especially concerning stakeholder engagement during the periods of policy formulation. This should include increasing the use of the Provincial Government website, newspaper advertisements, social media tools, and email web-blasts to explain the intentions and anticipated outcomes of specific policy tools. The KZN Provincial Government should provide updates on key socio-economic policy frameworks and initiatives, highlighting its expectations and giving timelines for progress towards their desired achievements. This would promote greater transparency and accountability within Government. These updates should be apolitical. A prerequisite for social cohesion is that communities should have legitimate avenues for expressing community grievances. These grievances should be taken seriously by government officials who should carefully record their engagement with communities and report back to them on the actions taken. When such issues are not promptly dealt with there is a likelihood of protests, which should be regarded as another legitimate way of addressing grievances.
- **Undertake on-going dialogues with societal institutions and stakeholders that can support the strengthening of social cohesion:** Participants in our discussions identified a number of societal institutions and stakeholders that play a positive and constructive role in strengthening social cohesion throughout KZN. This dialogue should strive to both engage these communities on policy and community issues surrounding social cohesion as well as promote values of tolerance and equality throughout all of their work. Suggested institutions include:

  - Political parties
  - Media
  - Religious institutions and formations
  - Educational institutions
  - Business
  - Community leaders

All of the recommendations outlined above can be implemented through embracing a new paradigm on the part of the provincial government, business, workers and other social partners. However, such efforts may flounder if this approach is not manifest at the national

level. As such, the provincial government and its social partners should also take it upon themselves to promote this paradigm in their interaction with peers in other provinces and the national government.

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## Annex A: Diagrammatic representation of threats

<b>POLITICO-CIVIC THREATS (INSTITUTIONAL)</b>			
<b>Threat</b>	<b>Manifestations</b>	<b>Consequences</b>	<b>Vulnerability</b>
<b>1) Compromised government relations with citizens</b>	Slow responses to citizen grievances	Citizens use other means, sometimes violent, to express themselves  Increased acts of corruption  Reduced citizen buy-in to government initiatives	Government is vulnerable to negative perceptions of its relations with citizens; government also runs the risk of losing citizen participation in planning and other initiatives  Citizens and residents of the Province are vulnerable to feeling isolated from government decision-making  Citizens and communities are vulnerable to what they perceive as the increasing criminalisation and commercialisation of their struggles
	Poor communication between government and citizens		
	Perception that it is not acceptable to have different views from government		
	Perception that there are no clear goals and no commitments to achieving a better society		
	Effectiveness of government subject to having access to particular individuals		
	Politicisation of government and non-government bodies		
	Important issues for citizenry are not reflected in government priorities		
	Perceived strategy of 'Control over' society rather than 'governing with' people		
	Increasing criminalisation and securitisation of public demonstrations		
	Commercialisation of people's struggles		
	Language barriers in government offices		
	Lack of cohesion between different government departments		
Lack of capacity and sensitivity in dealing with			

	certain issues.		
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Threat	Manifestations	Consequences	Vulnerability
2) Corruption	Mal-distribution of resources	Depletion of resources of the state Increased tensions between government and citizens	Government is vulnerable as corruption impacts on its finances and administration
	Poor service delivery		Corruption damages the moral fabric as well as public trust in government
	Compromised decision-making	De-legitimisation of government institutions and departments	Communities are vulnerable to poor and inefficient decisions that are made as the result of corruption
	Irregular procurement	Higher transaction costs for all citizens	Private sector actors are vulnerable to skewed decision-making processes that could affect their access to government resources and opportunities
	Diminished legitimacy of institutions	Increased political tensions Reinforcement of socio-economic inequalities	Private sector actors are more incentivised to undertake corrupt actions in order to access resources from government and other stakeholders

<b>SOCIO-ECONOMIC THREATS (STRUCTURAL)</b>			
Threat	Manifestations	Consequences	Vulnerability
1) Poverty	Inequalities in educational standards	Potential for violence and other social ills,	Government at all levels is vulnerable to the expressions

	Low skills base	such as substance abuse and criminality	of frustration and discontent from communities living in poverty
	High number of social grant dependents	Low health indicators and development outcomes	Communities are vulnerable to the impact of poverty including substance abuse and violent crime
	Lack of income	Increased social tensions and divisions resulting from the experience of relative deprivation	Private sector actors are also vulnerable to the effects of poverty, though, for example the damage of private property and risk to life from violent social protests
	Lack of productive resources for livelihood		
	Hunger and malnutrition		
	Homelessness and inadequate housing	Social exclusion and marginalisation	Society at large is vulnerable through the exclusion of large proportions of individuals excluded from meaningful socio-economic participation as well as in administrative and political decision-making
	Social discrimination and exclusion	Reduced potential for social mobility	
	Lack of participation in decision-making	Reduced access to security and justice	

Threat	Manifestations	Consequences	Vulnerability
2) Inequitable Access to Quality Education	Inequalities in provision of high standard education, across class and across geographical divides	Low skills base  Social exclusion and marginalisation  Depressed levels of expectations (culture of poverty)	Society at large is vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by the powers that be  Government and society are vulnerable to diminishing and stagnant human capital
	Increasing cost of university education and related fees	Reinforcement of existing inequalities resulting in increased social stratification	Private sector does not have necessary skills base to increase productivity or to generate additional employment opportunities
	Lack of civic education and awareness	Diminishing or stagnant human capital	

Threat	Manifestations	Consequences	Vulnerability
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<b>3) Unemployment</b>	Loss or absence of income and livelihood	Low self-esteem Poverty	Individuals and their families  Government is vulnerable to the consequential lower tax base and depressed consumption  Government is also vulnerable to social unrest  Private sector actors are vulnerable to the consequences of a smaller consumer base
	Loss or absence of skills development	Hunger and malnutrition Non-attainment of basic conditions of life	
	Loss or absence of employment benefits	Stress and related mental health problems	
	High numbers of cases at the CCMA; high numbers of dismissals of low skilled employees		

Threat	Manifestations	Consequences	Vulnerability
<b>4) Spatial Legacies of apartheid</b>	Prevalence of townships, underdevelopment, informal settlements, peri-urban settlements	Marginalisation and social deprivation  Relative deprivation	Those at the margins of society are vulnerable to deprivation  Government is vulnerable to social unrest  Families and communities are vulnerable to the stresses of migration  Private sector actors are vulnerable to social unrest that could manifest from unaddressed spatial legacies, e.g. mining companies
	Limited exposure to other ways of life	Stereotyping as a consequence of limited exposure	
	Transport challenges for jobs and leisure activities	Reinforcement of structural inequalities  Differential levels of service provision	
	Differential levels of service provision	Increased costs of social services	
	Reticence to share spaces with those of other races, classes or communities	Pressure on family life	
	Limited ability to adapt to specific needs, e.g. disabled	Increased financial and time resources spent on travel to and from work	
	Increased contributions to migrant labour system		

## SOCIO-CULTURAL THREATS (SOCIETAL)

Threat	Manifestations	Consequences	Vulnerability
<b>1) Prejudice</b>	Negative Perceptions	Limited space for self-expression and identification and the marginalisation of identity	Discriminated individuals are subject to harassment, intimidation and increased potential of violence
	Hate Speech		
	Stereotypes and xenophobia		Affected marginalised communities that are discriminated against en masse (e.g. rural communities)
	Verbal Harassment		
	Inconsistent implementation of laws (e.g. equality of law, human rights laws)	Disincentives for pursuing economic opportunities and jobs	Private sector entities (especially small businesses and informal businesses), which are managed and run by those individuals impacted, are subject to harassment, loss of customers, and potential property damage
	Preservation and reinforcement of unequal power dynamics	Fear and insecurity	
	Lack of ability to engage with others (e.g. on language)	Social Stratification	
	Subtle discriminatory actions	Marginalisation and Stigmatisation	Actors from private sector entities who feel that they are discriminated against (e.g. tenders) feel increasing isolation from and resentment towards those perceived to be committing prejudiced acts
Isolation			
	Psychological Trauma	Government is perceived to lose legitimacy because government is not seen as belonging to everyone	
	Physical violence (e.g. abuse, rape)		

Threat	Manifestations	Consequences	Vulnerability
<b>2) Absence of shared values</b>	Materialism	Feelings of resentment and jealousy	Society at large is vulnerable to the consequences of the absence of shared values
	Consumerism		
	Decline in ethical behaviour	Heightened competition between individuals	Government is vulnerable through the consequences of a less harmonious society that is

	Individualism over 'ubuntu'	Lack of manifesting cohesive identity	more susceptible to inter-communal tensions and incidents of violence
	Decline in respect	Inability to resolve communal tensions	
	Misperceptions and prejudices		
	Intolerance across identity markers		